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SUMMARY 
This thesis consists of two studies. The first study examines state-owned enterprises in China. 
Since 1978 the Chinese government has implemented many reforms of stated-owned enterprises 
(SOEs), including selling, merging, and closing SOEs. With these reforms, the central 
government has substantially reduced the number of its SOEs and retained control of only a small 
number of SOEs. In this study, we examine whether economic objectives or political objectives, 
principally on the employment level, have an effect on the decision of the central government to 
retain control of SOEs. Using Heckman’s two-stage estimation procedure and Lee’s (1978) 
method, we find that the central government controls SOEs the labor intensity of which is higher 
than that of local SOEs. We also find that the central government prefers to retain SOEs that are 
in the mining and information industries. Lastly, central government decision making varies 
strategically with the different degrees of development of the market and institutions in China’s 
provinces. In sum, the central government strategically manages state-owned enterprises. This 
finding suggests that in a partially privatized emerging market such as the market in China, 
government involvement in firm activities can affect the cross-sectional distribution of firm 
performance.  
The second study investigates state-owned banks in China. In 1995 the Chinese government 
enacted the Commercial Bank Act to enforce and regulate commercial banking activities. The 
government hoped that the Act, together with other bank reforms, would promote risk 
  vii 
management among commercial banks, and hence the banks would stop policy lending to 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs). This study examines the lending behavior of a 
government-controlled commercial bank before and after the passage of the Act. Within a 
simultaneous framework in which the lending rate, maturity, and collateral status are written into 
the loan contract at the same time, we find that the bank tightened control of the credit risk of 
borrowers after the passage of the Act. We also find that SOEs are charged a rate of interest 
higher than that charged to private firms by 6 basis points after controlling for other factors.  
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CHAPTER 1  
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
The strong influence of governments on economic activities has been widely recognized. 
Governments use various means, such as regulations and taxes, to engage in economic 
development activities. One clear manifestation of government participation in the economy is 
government ownership of economic entities. La Porta et al. (2002) find that the pervasive 
government ownership of banks (in 1995, 42% of equity of the 10 largest banks was state owned) 
around the world has significant and long-term consequences for economic and financial 
development. High government ownership of banks in 1970 was associated with slower 
subsequent financial development and lower growth of per capital income and productivity. One 
need not look only at banks; government ownership of enterprises is also common and influential 
around the world. Usually the government is the largest investor in big corporations. La Porta et 
al. (1999) report that there is 15%-20% state ownership of large corporations in 27 wealthy 
economies. Through state ownership, public enterprises operate in many industries, from the 
service sector to the manufacturing sector, and produce a wide variety of products to meet needs 
of even small groups of consumers. 
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No economist would ignore the importance of governments, but the justification of 
state ownership is still debatable because a government usually has two kinds of 
incentives and they are not always desirable. The first is the incentive from the market. In 
a good market economy, the price of a product clears the demand and supply from 
consumers and producers and the property rights are secured by law. To develop such a 
market, a government needs to design a set of institutions to get the market to work. After 
that, economic growth is sustainable because the economic agents are regulated by a set 
of rules. However, a government must consider many factors in designing institutions, 
because incentives can accrue from political spheres. For example, politicians are 
concerned with the level of employment. Political considerations of employment usually 
affect firm performance. An illustrative case is a state sugar-milling monopoly in 
Bangladesh that employed 8,000 unneeded workers while forcing the price of sugar in the 
country to stay at a level twice as high as the international level (World Bank, 1995). This 
kind of example can be found in almost any country, and similar stories can be told about 
government-owned banks. Credit Lyonnais in France lost US$30 billion when it 
attempted to become a largest bank in Europe to rival Deutsche Bank and the major 
American investment banks. This ambition had suited French bureaucrats and politicians 
in 1987 when Credit Lyonnais first developed the plan to grow. However, many losses 
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were incurred due to poor lending decisions as the bank tried to expand quickly, and a 
large share of the losses was attributed to fraud.  
1.2 MOTIVATION AND OBJECTIVES OF THESIS  
Chapter 2 studies the state asset management for SOEs. From 1978, Chinese government has 
been reforming its economy from a centrally planned one to a market economy. The Chinese 
government faces tremendous decision to let go most of its SOEs while retain the control small 
part of SOEs. There are limited studies to examine the interaction between the central government 
and SOEs during the transition period. This provides a good opportunity to investigate the 
incentives of the central government to manage SOEs. We examine whether economic objectives 
or political objectives, principally on the employment level, have an effect on the central 
government’s decision to retain control of SOEs. We find that political objectives are important in 
the central government’s decision making.  
Chapter 3 studies the legislative impact on lending. China’s economy has been growing about 
10% per year in real terms over the last decade. Research on bank efficiency in developing 
countries strongly suggests that the observed high growth rates cannot continue without 
significant reform of the banking reform. Nevertheless, there are limited papers to study the 
recent development of banking reform in China. Do government controlled banks monitor their 
loans? What is the outcome of the banking reform in China? This thesis hopes to provide some 
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evidence to answer those questions. We examine the lending behavior of a state bank before and 
after the enactment of the Commercial Bank Act in 1995. We find that this state bank tightened 
control of the credit risk of borrowers after the passage of the Act. We also find that this state 
bank has not given favorable loan terms to state borrowers after the passage of the Act. In general, 
after 1997, SOEs have been charged a rate of interest higher than that charged to private firms by 
6 basis points after controlling for other factors.  
1.3. POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTION OF THESIS 
Chapter 2 contributes the literature in several ways. First, the study complements the 
privatization literature. The central government does not privatize all SOEs because it sees the 
importance and many benefits of state ownership compared to private ownership. Thus, we are 
motivated to know what these benefits are. Second, the previous literature has found that firm 
performance is negatively related with state ownership (Dewenter and Malatesta 2001, Sun and 
Tong 2003, Wei et al. 2005). This negative relation can be attributed to either government 
incentives to pursue political goals or the low incentive of bureaucrats to manage firms, yet it is 
not clear which reason dominates. The results of this paper provide some insights into the 
explanation for the observed negative relation. Third, this paper has implications for firm 
valuation. In a partially privatized emerging market such as the market in China, government 
involvement in firm activities can affect the cross-sectional distribution of firm performance. 
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Therefore, we need to adjust for the selection issue when examining firm performance. Lastly, we 
explore how local conditions can affect central government decision making as we assume local 
governments and local conditions differ across the country. We expect that central government 
decision making will vary strategically with the different degrees of development of the market 
and institutions of China’s provinces.  
Chapter 3 contributes to the literature by providing new evidence on recent development in 
bank lending. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first empirical research that reports 
comprehensive evidence on the pricing strategy of a government-owned commercial bank in 
China. The results of this study provide useful statistics for policy makers and investors to 
evaluate the performance of government banks over the past 14 years. It shows the change in 
government bank-lending strategies and the positive effects that the enactment of the Act have 
had on Chinese commercial banks. 
1.4. ORGNIZATION OF THESIS 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Chapter 2 is an independent essay that 
examines the central government incentives to retain the control of SOEs. There are subsections 
of introduction, hypothesis, data, methodology, and results. Chapter 3 is another independent 
essay that investigates the legislative impact of the Commercial Bank Act on the lending behavior 
of a state bank. It has similar structure as in Chapter 2. Finally, Chapter 4 concludes the thesis. 
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CHAPTER 2 
HOW DOES THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT STRATEGICALLY MANAGE STATE 
OWNERSHIP? POLITICAL VS. ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES  
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Government ownership of firms is commonly perceived to be a less efficient or less profitable 
ownership structure than is private ownership. Shleifer and Vishny (1998) note that grabbing hand 
government can account for the poor performance of SOEs. Having large concentrated control 
rights and few cash flow rights, government officials will direct firms to pursue political and social 
objectives that are detrimental to firm performance. 
However, government can behave like a helping hand when there are market failures, which 
often justify government intervention in the marketplace and corporations. Empirical studies yield 
mixed results on government ownership and firm performance. Kole and Mulherin (1997) find 
that the performance of American government-owned companies is not significantly different 
from the performance of private sector firms in the same industry. However, Dewenter and 
Malatesta (2001) show that government-owned firms are significantly less profitable than are 
private firms. The controversy on government ownership and firm performance is also found in 
studies that are conducted using Chinese data. Many of these empirical findings are related to the 
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Chinese SOE reform.1 Groves et al. (1994) offer evidence that the productivity of Chinese 
stated-owned firms has improved significantly due to some elementary incentives, which were 
introduced as a response to the increased autonomy of SOEs. Li (1997) further confirms the 
effectiveness of China’s incremental industrial reform and attributes the improvements in total 
factor productivity (TFP) growth to improved incentives, intensified product market competition, 
and improved factor allocation. These two pioneering papers incorporate the incentive of 
managers into their analysis and study how decentralized incentives can positively affect firm 
performance. However, Sun and Tong (2003) find that state ownership has a negative impact on 
firm performance after share issue privatization. Similarly, Wei et al. (2005) find that state shares 
are significantly negatively related to Tobin’s Q, and that significant convex relations exist 
between Tobin’s Q and state shares.  
The difference in the findings can be attributed to the perspective that the authors take. In the 
studies of Groves et al. (1994) and Li (1997), the researchers examine whether the output of 
SOEs increases over time. They compare the performance of SOEs before and after reforms. In 
the studies of Sun and Tong (2003) and Wei et al. (2005), the researchers compare the 
                                                 
1
 Since 1978, China has implemented a series of reforms of state-owned assets management. From 1978 to 1983, the 
vast majority of ownership of enterprises was transferred to local governments at the provincial and municipal levels. 
This was followed by fiscal reform of the tax sharing system in 1994 that gave the residual claim to enterprise earnings 
to the local governments and the central government exclusively. By pairing the control rights with residual returns, 
China effectively transferred the property rights of most state-owned enterprises to local governments. In addition, 
since 1994, managers of SOEs have been granted a growing degree of autonomy from the government. They enjoy the 
right to set product prices, to hire and fire workers, to make investments, and so on. 
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performance of SOEs with that of private enterprises and find that state ownership is not better 
than private ownership. In our study, we do not compare the present performance of SOEs with 
their past performance or with the performance of  private enterprises, but first estimate the firm 
performance of central SOEs and local SOEs (SOEs that are owned by provincial, city, or county 
governments), calculate the net difference between the two, and then examine whether economic 
factors, such as firm performance, or political factors, such as employment, affect the decision of 
the central government to retain control of central SOEs. We are interested in examining the 
central government’s decision making because the incentives of the central government might be 
important and this issue has been neglected in the literature. 
Since 1978 the Chinese government has implemented many reforms of SOEs, including selling, 
merging, and closing SOEs. With these reforms, the central government has substantially reduced 
the number of its SOEs and retained control of only a small number of SOEs. Using a recent 
example, the newly established State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission 
(SASAC) of the State Council took over SOEs from the former Central Committee for Large 
Enterprises to manage central SOEs. It had shareholdings in 196 enterprises upon its 
establishment in 2003. By November 30, 2005, SASAC had reduced its holding to 169 
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enterprises.2 According to Li Rong Rong, the chairman of SASAC, SASAC plans to further 
reduce the number of central government firms to 100 or less through restructuring and 
downsizing.3 This gradual adjustment of the central government’s shareholding provides a good 
opportunity to investigate the role of the government in the transition.  
In a specific context, we examine whether economic or non-economic objectives, principally 
on the employment level, also have an effect on the central government’s decision to retain 
control of SOEs. We argue that the central government’s decision to continue the management of 
SOEs is determined by (i) economic objectives and/or (ii) political objectives. Economic 
objectives focus on the expected firm valuation and profit. It is expected that due to economic 
objectives, the central government will keep a SOE that will perform better under its control than 
it would if it were controlled by a local government. That is, if the central government believes 
that the SOE is comparatively more efficient under its control than it would be under a local 
government’s control, the central government will keep the firm. In contrast, political objectives 
include other factors, such as the employment level in the firms. 
To conduct the analysis, we use 726 Chinese listed firms and 2377 observations from 1998 to 
2001. According to the disclosed information on the largest shareholders of each firm, we classify 
                                                 
2
 State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council, 2005, 
http://www.sasac.gov.cn/zyqy/qyml/default.htm (accessed November 30, 2005). 
3
 Security Times, March 14, 2005. 
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the SOEs into two groups for each year: central SOEs and local SOEs, with 480 and 1897 
observations, respectively. Because the central government may strategically choose to retain 
control of firms, we use the Heckman two-stage method to correct for this selection bias. Then, 
we augment Lee’s (1978) method to recover how the central government forms a strategy to 
retain SOEs. Our results indicate that the central government considers multiple factors when 
making such decisions. First, we find that when making a decision, the central government 
considers non-economic factors to be more important than economic factors. It controls SOEs the 
labor intensity of which is higher than that of local SOEs. Second, to adjust the structure of the 
economy, the central government is inclined to sell firms in the real estate, wholesale trade, and 
retail trade industries, whereas it tends to retain control of firms in the mining and information 
industries. Finally, we find that local conditions affect central government decision making. The 
central SOEs are likely to be located in provinces in which there is little local government 
involvement in the local economy, a good regional legal environment but lower level of private 
employment, and stronger local government protectionism against interprovincial trading.  
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, the study complements the 
privatization literature. The central government does not privatize all SOEs because it sees the 
importance and many benefits of state ownership compared to private ownership. Thus, we are 
motivated to know what these benefits are. In addition, there is the issue of aligning the 
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manager’s interest with firm performance in a corporation. Supporters of privatization take the 
view that by privatizing, the owner is accountable for the firm’s performance. However, 
advocates of state ownership believe that hiring good managers and granting them more 
autonomy rights are more important. In this regard, state ownership is very different from private 
ownership. This distinctive framework compels us to understand the motivations of the 
government’s strategy to manage state-owned assets.   
Second, the previous literature has found that firm performance is negatively related with state 
ownership (Dewenter and Malatesta 2001, Sun and Tong 2003, Wei et al. 2005). This negative 
relation can be attributed to either government incentives to pursue political goals or the low 
incentive of bureaucrats to manage firms, yet it is not clear which reason dominates. The results 
of this paper provide some insights into the explanation for the observed negative relation. 
Third, this paper has implications for firm valuation. In a partially privatized emerging market 
such as the market in China, government involvement in firm activities can affect the 
cross-sectional distribution of firm performance. Therefore, we need to adjust for the selection 
issue when examining firm performance. 
Lastly, we explore how local conditions can affect central government decision making as we 
assume local governments and local conditions differ across the country. We expect that central 
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government decision making will vary strategically with the different degrees of development of 
the market and institutions of China’s provinces.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents our hypotheses, model 
specification, and estimation. Section 2.3 describes our sample and descriptive statistics. Section 
2.4 presents the results. Section 2.5 discusses the implications of this study and concludes the 
paper.  
 
2. 2 HYPOTHESES, MODEL SPECIFICATION, AND ESTIMATION  
2.2.1 MODEL SPECIFICATION AND ESTIMATION 
Our main purpose is to investigate the determinants of the decision of the central government 
to retain SOEs. In this analysis, we have to bear in mind the sample selection problem that is 
inherent in this study. Although we observe only the ex post status of SOEs, it is most likely that, 
ex ante, the central government selectively decided to retain control of SOEs. Unless the central 
government made decisions randomly, OLS regression estimates are inconsistent due to the 
sample selection bias. To overcome this problem, we use Heckman two-stage estimation (1979) 
to correct for the sample selection bias, and then use a third-stage procedure that was developed 
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by Lee (1978) to recover the central government’s decision. The econometric procedure is 
described by Heckman (1979) and Lee (1978, 1979). We provide the model specification and 
estimation in section 2.2.1, and give the variable descriptions in section 2.2.2.  
Consider the case in which the central government has a choice to hold shares of SOEs or not. 
We do not include a third alternative, to privatize central SOEs, because there is no case in this 
sample period in which the central government sells its shares to a private owner. We represent a 
binary choice set as {Il, Ic} and the performance outcome as pi . The decision of the central 
government to hold shares of SOEs is defined as Ic and the alternative, that the local government 
holds shares of SOEs, is defined as Il. The performance outcome need not be defined strictly in 
terms of profits. pi  represents profits (ROA), firm valuation (Tobin’s Q), and labor intensity 
(Labor). The choice set leads to two potential performance outcomes: pi c if Ic is chosen and pi l 
if Il is chosen. From a central government perspective, we are interested in the performance of the 
chosen strategy versus the counterfactual (pi c - pi l). The difference is called the treatment effect. 
However, for any SOE we observe only one of these two performance outcomes, which raises the 
question of how to estimate the treatment effect.  
The simplest estimation approach compares the mean outcomes of two types of firms, which 
implies that the choice effect is given by E(pi c|Ic) - E(pi l|Il). The average effect of choice can be 
estimated by a simple regression using the model iiii XI εβpi +′+∂+∂= 21  for I = 1,2,…, n. 
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Control variables Xi is a vector of observed firm characteristics. The specification assumes the 
strategy choice is exogenous, and the effect of the strategy is homogenous across firms. However, 
the effect of strategy may vary across firms with different values of the observed characteristics 
Xi. To allow for a heterogeneous treatment effect, let the performance for each alternative 
strategy be given by 
cipi = cicic X εβ +′        (1) 
lipi = lilil X εβ +′ .        (2) 
Equations (1) and (2) can be estimated separately by OLS using subsamples. The average 
treatment effect for a firm with characteristics Xi can be given by ( )lc ββ ′−′ Xi. However, 
estimating (1) and (2) by OLS is appropriate only when all factors that affect performance and 
strategy choice are observable and included in the regression. This is rarely the case. For example, 
it is possible that the central government might choose to hold SOEs to require that they have 
excess employment, and this unobservable factor would affect firm valuation and profitability. 
Consequently, when choice and performance outcomes jointly depend on factors that are 
unobserved by the researcher, approaches that do not account for this relationship are likely to 
yield biased estimates of choice on performance.  
Heckman (1979) and Lee (1978) introduced a method to account for this bias. Suppose that the 
central government choice is a function of three factors: (1) the expected net benefits (losses) of Ic 
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versus Il, (2) factors Zi that affect strategy choices but that do not affect outcome performance, 









cii ZI εαpipiγpipiγγ +′+−+−+= )ˆˆ()ˆˆ( 321* ,    (3) 
where I*i is the latent variable: if I*i = 1, the firms are central SOEs, if I*I = 0, the firms are 




ci pipi ˆˆ −  (i.e., firm valuation and profitability); the parameter 3γ  measures the net effect of the 
choice on non-economic factors NEli
NE
ci pipi ˆˆ −  (i.e., labor intensity); Z is the industry affiliations 
and regional factors; and subscript c and l represent the corresponding observations from the 
sample of central SOEs and the sample of local SOEs, respectively.  
The coefficients on the differentials shed some light on the predictions of political objectives 
and economic objectives. If the central government is concerned with economic factors, we 
should see a significant coefficient on 2γ . Conversely, if the central government is concerned 
with employment, we should see a significant coefficient on 3γ . The signs of the coefficients 
also matter. When 2γ  > 0 and 3γ  > 0, this suggests that the central government is more likely 
to keep firms that have ex-ante higher firm performance and greater labor intensity, respectively, 
and vice versa. We hypothesize that the central government pursues multiple objectives and 
expect to see a positive sign on 2γ  and 3γ .    
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To estimate equation (3), we can substitute (1) and (2) into (3) after adjusting for unobservable 
factors as follows (equations (4) and (5)). Under the assumption that lici εε ,  and iε  are jointly 
normally distributed, Heckman and Lee showed that a sample selection corrected equation can be 
















li IMRX εσβpi ++′= .       (5) 
Similar estimation is done for NEcipi  and 
NE
lipi . 
Inverse Mills’ Ratio (IMR hereafter) reflects the unobservable factors that the central 















.φ  is the density function, and Φ  is 
the distribution function of the standard normal variable iψ that is estimated from the 
reduced-form probit model equation (6).  
iiiit eZXI +′+′= ακ .       (6)   
To estimate the full model, we estimate backwards from (6) to (3). The first-stage probit model 
is to estimate equation (6). Then, we obtain IMRs and include them in the second-stage 
estimation of (4) and (5). This is done separately for the samples of central SOEs and local SOEs. 
After obtaining consistent estimates of Ecipi  and 
E
lipi  in equations (4) and (5), Ecipi  and Elipi  
are calculated using those estimates for the whole sample, but not with the coefficient of IMR. A 
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similar procedure is used to obtain NEcipi  and 
NE
lipi . Finally, we include the differentials in 
performance between central government firms and local government firms in the third stage for 
all samples in equation (3). 
The model is estimated using contemporaneous data because we model in such a way that the 
central government looks at the expected performance (fitted value) of two types of firms. We 
also used one-period lag data to estimate the model, and the results are not qualitatively different 
from this one.          
Besides IMR, the variables used in the estimation consist of the following variables: 
E
itpi : Tobin’s Q, ROA; 
NE
itpi : Labor (labor intensity); 
E
itX : itititititit DSHHISYSKSKSize ..,,)/(,)/log(,)/log(, 2 ; 
NE
itX : itititit HHIWageLeverageSize ,,, ; and 
Zit: various regional institutional factorsit, industry dummiesit. 
2.2.2 VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS 
The measure of market valuation is Tobin’s Q. It is calculated as the sum of the market value 
of tradable A and B shares, the book value of nontradable shares, long term liability, and short 
term liability, which is divided by the book value of total assets. Profitability is measured by the 
  18 
return on assets (ROA) as net income scaled by total assets and then adjusted by deducting the 
industry mean. According to Demsetz and Villaloga (2001), Tobin’s Q and ROA are different 
measures of firm performance: Tobin’s Q is a forward-looking estimate of what management will 
accomplish, whereas ROA is a backward-looking estimate of what management has accomplished. 
We do not intend to argue for or against either of these measures of performance as each has its 
advantages and disadvantages. 
Following Dewenter and Malatesta (2001), we use labor intensity (Labor), which is defined as 
the number of employees in an enterprise divided by its assets, then multiplied by 1,000,000. 
Employment is the key form of the manifestation of political power. It has been an article of faith 
that SOEs’s activities are influenced by politicians. One obvious manifestation of the influence is 
to have excess employment. Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny (1996) studies politicians’ influence on 
firm by looking at how politicians bargain with reformers on excess employment during 
privatization process. The politicians seek a trade off between political objective (excess 
employment) and efficiency of firms. Empirical research such as that of Dewenter and Malatesta 
(2001) has found that public firms are associated with higher labor intensity. Follow Dewenter 
and Malatesta (2001)’s measure, we use labor intensity as a proxy for political objective to test 
the implication of Boycko, et (1996) model.  
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Before we present the variables for Xit, we point to the identification issue of the system. 
Identifying variables should meet two requirements. First, the variables are included and 
statistically significant in the central government’s choice equation (i.e., enter the first-stage 
equation), but do not affect the performance or labor intensity of SOEs (i.e., do not enter the 
second-stage equation). Second, if we put them in the second stage (but without IMR), they are 
not significant. Such variable(s) allow the identification of the choice equation (3) and the 
performance and labor intensity equations (equations 4 and 5). In this model, industry dummies 
and regional institutional factors are the major identifying variables. 
Regional institutional factors for each province per year are used to control for regional 
economic conditions. The government and market relationship index measures the degree of 
market competition and government intervention. In general, the higher the index is, the faster the 
development of the market. The private investment index measures the extent of private 
investment in the local economy. The higher the index is, the greater the private investment. The 
private employment index measures the extent of the labor force of private enterprises among all 
enterprises. The higher the index is, the greater the labor force from the private sector. The local 
protectionism index measures the extent of protectionism against interprovincial trading. The 
higher the index is, the lower the level of local trade protectionism. The credit market index 
measures the development of the credit market. The higher the index is, the higher the 
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competition in the credit market. The labor mobility index measures the mobility of the labor 
force from rural areas to cities. The higher the index is, the higher the mobility. Lastly, the legal 
environment index measures the number of legal cases and the court’s efficiency in solving legal 
cases. The higher the index is, the more developed the legal environment. To summarize, the 
higher the indices are, the more market-friendly the environment.  
Eleven industry dummies are used to control for industry effect. Industry dummy variables are 
used to show the directions of the central government’s strategic adjustments in industry 
structure.  
We follow Himmelberg et al. (1999) to include control variables in Xit. Firm Size is the log 
form of total assets. The motivation for the inclusion of size is two fold. Large SOEs have a 
higher market share and greater market power, which might be good for firm performance. 
However, at the same time, large firms might experience a greater degree of government 
bureaucracy, which is detrimental to firm performance (Sun and Tong 2003).  Thus, it is an 
empirical question whether the impact of Size is positive or negative on Tobin’s Q and ROA.  
Ln(K/S) is the log form of the ratio of tangible, long-term assets (PPE) to sales. It is used to 
measure the alleviation of agency problems because tangible assets are easier to monitor and are 
good collateral. [Ln(K/S)]2 is the square of Ln(K/S), which allows us to examine the possibility of 
nonlinearities between firm performance and agency problems. 
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Y/S is measured as operating income divided by sales. We use Y/S to measure the firm’s free 
cash flow problem. Although free cash flow is unobservable, it is presumably correlated with 
operating income. As suggested by Jensen (1986), the higher a firm’s cash flow is, the more 
likely the rent seeking behavior of managers.  
HHI is the Herfindahl-Index (3 categories). It is calculated as the sum of the squares of the 
market shares of each individual firm in the market per year. We classify this index into three 
categories: 1—low concentration, where the H index < 0.1, 2—moderate concentration, where 
0.1 < H index < 0.18, and lastly, 3—high concentration, where the H index > 0.18. We use HHI 
to control for the competitive or monopolistic character in an industry. Many SOEs, especially 
central SOEs, are in a monopolistic position. They control the raw materials and set the selling 
prices. The effect of this market structure is likely to influence a company’s valuation, profits, 
and labor intensity.  
S.D. is the standard deviation of the monthly stock returns per year.   
Next, we discuss the control variables of the labor intensity equation. Wage is the average 
annual wage in urban collectively owned enterprises in a corresponding province, scaled by 
10,000. It is used as a proxy for the average market wage. We intend to capture how changes in 
the market wage will cause changes in labor intensity. One possibility is that an increase in the 
market wage may cause workers in SOEs to leave if they find that the outside wage options are 
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more attractive. For this reason, we expect a negative relation between Wage and Labor, but there 
could be an alternative explanation. When the market wage increases, SOEs may increase their 
wages accordingly. However, to maintain labor costs, a wage rise at the firm level will lead to 
labor force cuts, which reduces labor intensity. Therefore, both explanations could account for the 
negative relation. 
Leverage is total liability over total assets. The inclusion of Leverage is used to examine the 
effect of financial conditions on employment. This is based on the view that the disciplinary role 
of debt helps to limit agency costs. When debt increases, borrowing costs rise. If managers are 
concerned with bankruptcy or an increase in borrowing costs, they might freeze recruitment, or 
even cut back on staff. This would lead to a negative relationship between Leverage and Labor. 
Ogawa (2003), Lang et al. (1996), and Nickell and Nicolistsa (1999) empirically find a negative 
relation in Japan, the United States, and the United Kingdom, respectively.  
Finally, year dummy variables (not reported) are included to control for annual mean effects in 
the dependent variable. We also include the ownership ratio of the largest shareholders 
(Largestshare) for additional information.  
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2.3 DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
The sample in this study includes 726 Chinese listed companies for the period of 1998-2001. 
The accounting variables are derived from CSMAR financial.4 Tobin’s Q and the number of 
employees for each company were downloaded from Tinysoft. 5  Ownership structure and 
shareholder information are obtained from Genius.6 The industry classification was downloaded 
from the Shanghai Stock Exchange. Finally, the market wage data are obtained from the China 
Statistical Yearbook for various years from 1997 to 2002. Regional institutional factors are hand 
collected data from a series of books (Marketization Index for China’s Provinces) that is 
published by the National Economic Research Institute (NERI), China Reform Foundation. The 
NERI uses the methodology of Economic Freedom of the World to rank Chinese provinces 
according to their level of market development. The higher the rank is, the better the indication of 
a market economy. We use the following indices: (i) government and market relationship index, 
(ii) private investment index, (iii) private employment index, (iv) local protectionism index, (v) 
credit market index, (vi) labor mobility index, and (vii) legal environment index.  
                                                 
4
 The CSMAR financial database is prepared by the China Accounting and Finance Research Center of Hong Kong 
Polytechnic University and Shenzhen GTA Information Technology. 
5
 Tinysoft provides comprehensive information on trading data, financial data, fund data, corporate governance data, 
mergers, acquisitions, and so on. The employee data is only available from 2000. There are 653 firms that have data on 
employee information. There are a total of 1634 observations from 2000 to 2001, with 307 and 1327 observations for 
central SOEs and local SOEs, respectively. 
6
 Genius is the commercial database in China. It provides all the annual reports and detailed information on the top 
shareholders.  
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2.3.1 IDENTIFICATION OF CENTRAL AND LOCAL SOES 
One of our primary concerns is the criteria for the classification of central and local SOEs. Our 
definition of ownership relies on control rights, not on cash flow rights. We consider the indirect 
control of government through the shareholdings of a government-owned group or government 
agency by collecting the largest shareholder’s information. We define the control by the central 
and the local governments as the sum of two types of control rights: (1) the shares that are 
directly owned by the central or local government if it is the largest shareholder, and (2) the 
shareholdings of the nominal agent that are controlled by the central or local government. 
Specifically, we determine the nature of the largest shareholder from the company’s annual 
reports that have been downloaded from Genius. We examine the background of the largest 
shareholder under the section “Shareholder’s information and change of shareholders.” Most of 
the companies disclosed information on the background of the largest shareholder, or the 
background of the ultimate controller of the largest shareholder. For some companies, if the 
information that was disclosed in the annual reports was insufficient to identify the nature of the 
shareholder, we looked for the information from the company’s webpage. If there was 
insufficient evidence to identify the background of the shareholder, we excluded this company. 
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Seventy-four firms were excluded from a total sample size of 800 firms for this reason. This 
selection procedure yielded a sample of 726 firms from 1998 to 2001.  
We are particularly interested in the data of the largest shareholder because we find that on 
average, the shareholding of the largest shareholder accounts for nearly 40% of the total shares. 
Therefore, we presume that the influence of the largest shareholder is substantially larger than 
that of the other shareholders.  
Two types of state shareholders are classified as central government shareholders. The first 
type is central government ministries. For example, Zhong Jin Nonferrous Metal Ltd. (stock code 
000060) lists the National Nonferrous Metal Bureau as the largest shareholder. However, state 
shareholders of this type are rare, because most central government ministries have been 
restructured into national industrial companies, which is the second type of state shareholders. 
The national industrial companies were restructured from national bureaus that the central 
government had used to regulate and administer the industry. One example is China Petroleum & 
Chemical Corporation (Sinopec Corp.), which was restructured from the National Bureau of 
Petroleum. Broadman (2001) comments on this restructuring: “in virtually all cases, these entities 
(the national industrial companies) retain governmental as well as business ownership functions. 
In fact, many of the underlying SOEs see little difference between the old sector line bureaus and 
the new structures—other than a name change” (p.13). Other national industry companies have 
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been set up by the central government for special purposes. For instance, China Great Wall Asset 
Management Company was established to help state banks strip off bad debt. As national 
industrial companies are directly and strictly controlled by the central government, they are 
treated as central government shareholders.  
Three types of state shareholders are classified as local government shareholders. The first type 
is local government bureaus. Typical local government shareholders are provincial and regional 
bureaus of finance. The Fuzhou Municipal Finance Bureau, for example, held 39.9% of the total 
outstanding shares in Fuzhou Fufa Co., Ltd. in 1998 and 1999. The second type is local state asset 
management bureaus. They act as the owners of SOEs on behalf of the local government, and are 
usually in charge of regional SOEs. The third type is local state assets operating companies. 
These are operating entities that represent the local government and monitor SOEs. Some 
companies, such as Hubei Construction Investment Ltd., are responsible for SOEs in certain 
industries, while other companies, such as the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone Development 
Group, are in charge of SOEs within certain districts.  
2.3.2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Table 1 presents three panels of the descriptive information for our sample. Panel A provides 
the means, standard deviations, maximum values, and minimum values for the key variables in 
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our sample. Panel B shows the differences of the mean tests between central SOEs and local 
SOEs for the key variables. The significance tests are conducted using the t-statistic and the 
Wilcoxon rank sum z-statistic. Panel C provides the summary statistics of HHI. 
The Tobin’s Q has a mean of 1.64 for the overall sample. Wei et al. (2005) find that the 
Tobin’s Q for Chinese listed firms is on average 2.92 from 1991 to 2001. Our estimates are lower 
than those of Wei et al. (2005) because we use only the market valuation for tradable shares and 
the book value for nontradable shares. In contrast, Wei et al. (2005) use the market value for all 
shares. We find that there is no statistical difference in Tobin’s Q between the central and local 
SOEs. The ROA bf adjmt, which stands for ROA before industry mean adjustment, on average, is 
3.2%. The ROA (after adjustment) of central SOEs is 0.8%, which is 1% significantly higher than 
that of local SOEs, which suggests that central SOEs are more profitable when they are measured 
by accounting numbers. The mean number of workers in the sample is 2912. Central SOEs have 
3303 workers. They have 492 more workers than have local SOEs, but when we scale the number 
of employee by the total assets of a firm, we find that central SOEs have a lower labor intensity of 
1.531, versus 1.85 for local SOEs.7  
                                                 
7
 We also use total sales to scale the number of employees, and the difference between the two groups is significant as 
well. 
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There are some differences in the firm characteristics for the two groups as well. First, central 
SOEs are on average larger than local SOEs. Second, the largest shareholding of central SOEs is 
4.6% higher than the largest shareholding of local SOEs. Third, central SOEs have lower 
Leverage and higher Y/S than have local SOEs. 
Panel C of Table 1 lists the HHI and the number of firms in each industry that is owned by 
local governments and the central government, respectively. There are two features. First, column 
1 shows that 93% of SOEs have low and moderate industry concentration, which suggests that 
the majority of SOEs do not have monopolistic power in China. Second, comparing columns 2 
and 3, we find that there is no strong difference in industry concentration between central and 
local SOEs.  
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Table 1. Descriptive data 
This data set comprises 726 Chinese listed firms, from 1998 to 2001. Tobin’s Q is calculated as 
the summary of the market value of tradable A and B shares, the book value of nontradable shares, 
long term liability, and short term liability, which is then divided by the book value of total assets. 
Profitability is measured as ROA: net income divided by total assets and then adjusted by 
deducting the industry mean. We also report ROA before the industry mean adjustment. 
Following Dewenter and Malatesta (2001), we use the measure for labor intensity, Labor, which 
is defined by the number of employees in enterprises divided by assets. Size is the natural log of 
the book value of total assets. Ln(K/S) is the log form of the ratio of tangible, long-term assets 
(PPE) to sales. [Ln(K/S)]2 is the square of Ln(K/S). Y/S is measured as operating income divided 
by sales. Leverage is defined as total debt divided by total assets. Worker is the number of 
employees in firms. Wage is the average annual wage in urban collectively owned enterprise in a 
corresponding province, scaled by 10,000. HHI (3 categories), the Herfindahl-Index, is calculated 
as the sum of the squares of the market shares of each individual firm in the market per year. 
Then, we divide this index into three categories, with 3 as the high concentration and 1 as the low 
concentration. S.D. is the standard deviation of the monthly stock returns per year. Largesthare is 
the fraction of shares that are held by the largest shareholder. The sample period for Labor and 
Worker is from 1999 to 2001. Panel A provides the means, standard deviations, maximum values, 
and minimum values for the key variables in our sample. 
 
Panel A. Summary statistics  
  Obs. Mean Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. 
Tobin’s Q 2377 1.64 6.95 0.71 0.555 
ROA bf adjmt 2377 0.032 0.094 0.014 0.013 
ROA 2377 0 0.217 -2.84 0.107 
Labor 1807 1.959 21.82 0 1.749 
Worker 1807 2912 45943 19 3920 
Size 2377 20.927 24.578 18.144 0.816 
Leverage 2377 0.447 3.542 0.009 0.226 
Wage 2377 11173.56 21993 5473 4255.871 
Largestshare 2377 0.458 0.886 0.022 0.176 
Ln(K/S) 2373 -0.433 3.263 -6.174 1.053 
[Ln(K/S)]2 2373 1.295 38.113 0 2.863 
Y/S 2377 0.082 4.311 -15.434 0.512 
HHI 2377 1.202 3 1 0.542 
S.D. 2377 0.112 0.673 0.011 0.053 
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Table 1 (continued) 
Panel B. Differences of the mean tests 
Panel B shows the differences of the mean test between central SOEs and local SOEs for the key 
variables. The significance tests are conducted using the two tailed t-statistic and the Wilcoxon 
rank sum z-statistic. The mean, median, and standard deviation (s.d.) are reported. 
 
Central-Local   Local SOEs(1) Central SOEs(2) 
(2)-(1) 







Tobin’s Q 1.642 0.551 1.633 0.57 -0.3 0.627 
  
-1.53   -1.525       
ROA 
-0.002 0.115 0.008 0.063 2.449** 1.702 
  
-0.01   -0.012       
Labor  2.069 1.85 1.531 1.195 -6.818** -5.401** 
  -1.67   -1.255       
Worker 2811 3709.439 3303 4634.11 1.894 1.244 
  -1914   -1630.5       
Size 20.889 0.763 21.08 0.985 3.967** 3.459** 
  
-20.821   -20.901       
Leverage 0.458 0.232 0.4 0.196 -5.543** -5.684** 
  
-0.443   -0.39       
Largest Share 0.449 0.171 0.495 0.19 4.786** 4.934** 
  
-0.448   -0.516       
Ln(K/S) 
-0.402 1.016 -0.557 1.179 -2.640** -2.641** 
  (-0.341)   (-0.488)     
[Ln(K/S)]2 1.194 2.58 1.7 3.759 2.765** 2.91** 
  
-0.372   -0.559     
Y/S 0.073 0.561 0.118 0.231 2.693** 1.51 
  -0.096   -0.106       
S.D. 0.111 0.052 0.115 0.057 1.385 0.859 
  
-0.1   -0.1       
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Table 1 (continued)  
Panel C. Summary statistics on HHI 
Panel C provides a simple correlation matrix for the variables in the sample.  
 
HHI index:   
1—An H index below 0.1 (or 1,000) indicates a low concentration. 
2—An H index between 0.1 to 0.18 (or 1,000 to 1,800) indicates a moderate concentration. 









 Obs. H index HHI (rank)  Obs. H index HHI  Obs H index 
HHI 
(rank) 
(1) Mining 19 0.245 3  7 0.192 3  12 0.275 3 
(2) Mass Communication, Arts, and  
Education 15 0.417  3  7 0.411 3  8 0.423 3 
(3) Utilities 110 0.109 2  91 0.109 2  19 0.111 2 
(4) Real Estate 104 0.096 1  98 0.096 1  6 0.099 1 
(5) Construction 46 0.187 3  31 0.191 3  15 0.181 3 
(6) Transportation and Warehousing 95 0.241 3  68 0.241 3  27 0.241 3 
(7) Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing 
and Hunting 69 0.084 1  60 0.084 1  9 0.085 1 
(8) Wholesale and Retail trade 293 0.035 1  270 0.035 1  23 0.035 1 
(9) Social Services 75 0.137 2  49 0.137 2  26 0.136 2 
(10) Information 141 0.082 1  86 0.083 1  51 0.082 1 
(11) Manufacturing 1271 0.012 1  1013 0.012 1  258 0.012 1 
(12) Conglomerate 139 0.060 1  113 0.060 1  26 0.061 1 
Total 2377 0.053 1  1897 0.049 1  480 0.068 1 
 
** and * indicate significance at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels, respectively. 
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2.4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
2.4.1 REDUCED FORM OF THE CHOICE MODEL 
Table 2 provides the estimates for the first-stage probit model. Industry affiliations, regional 
factors, and firm characteristics such as size, leverage, and tangible assets are important factors that 
affect the central government’s decision. The pseudo-R2 of the first-stage probit model is relatively 
high (0.119), which suggests that these variables are good instruments.   
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Table 2. Reduced form of the choice model 
This table presents estimates of the factors in the central government’s decision to hold shares of 
SOEs. Size is the natural log of the book value of total assets. Ln(K/S) is the log form of the ratio 
of tangible, long-term assets (PPE) to sales. [Ln(K/S)]2 is the square of Ln(K/S). Y/S is measured 
as operating income divided by sales. Leverage is defined as total debt divided by total assets. 
HHI (3 categories), the Herfindahl-Index, is calculated as the sum of the squares of the market 
shares of each individual firm in the market per year. Then, we divide this index into three 
categories, with 3 as the high concentration and 1 as the low concentration. S.D. is the standard 
deviation of the monthly stock returns per year. There are 11 industry dummies. The baseline is 
the manufacturing sector. There are six Regional institutional factors: (i) government and market 
relationship index, (ii) private investment index, (iii) private employment index, (iv) local 
protectionism index, (v) credit market index, (vi) labor mobility index, and (vii) legal 




















Mass Communication,  











Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing and Hunting -0.402 
 (1.865) 
Wholesale and Retail trade -0.792** 
 (5.870) 
Social Services 0.270 
 (1.275) 
Information 0.229 




Gov. and mkt. relationship index 0.026** 
 (3.768) 
Private investment index -0.001 
 (0.136) 
Private employment index -0.026** 
 (3.643) 
Local protectionism index -0.011* 
 (2.162) 
Credit market index 0.002 
 (0.312) 
Labor mobility index 0.002 
 (0.498) 





Log Likelihood -1048.140 
Pseudo-R2 0.119 
 
** and * indicate significance at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels, respectively. 
 
2.4.2 DETERMINANTS OF FIRM VALUATION, PROFIT, AND LABOR INTENSITY 
Table 3 presents the estimates of equations (4)-(5). To interpret the coefficients on IMR, we 
consider case 1, where cσ < 0, lσ > 0. Because IMR is always positive, cσ < 0 means that 
cicici XIE βpi ′>]|[  (recall equation (4)), and lσ >0 means lilili XIE βpi ′>]|[  (recall equation 
(5)). These inequalities imply that those SOEs that are chosen by the central government perform 
better than average central SOEs, and those SOEs that are chosen by the local government 
perform better than average local SOEs. 
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In case 2, where cσ < 0, lσ < 0, those SOEs that are chosen by the central government have 
better performance than average central SOEs, and those SOEs that are chosen by the local 
government have performance below average local SOEs. 
Case 3. cσ > 0, lσ > 0. This is the reverse of case 2   
Case 4. cσ > 0, lσ < 0. This is the reverse of case 1. 
Based on the central government objective function, cases 1-3 are likely to happen, whereas 
case 4 should rarely occur in practice because under both situations all firms yield poorer 
performance than the alternative. 
Table 3 shows that the coefficients on IMR are significant for all of the specifications. It 
suggests the importance of controlling for sample selection bias because the central government 
strategically holds firm shares.  
We first examine the results for the Tobin’s Q and ROA equations in panel A of Table 3. In 
case 1, Ecσ < 0 and Elσ > 0. This implies that the mean performance of these chosen central 
SOEs is better than that of average firms (if all firms are forced to be central SOEs) and the mean 
performance of these chosen local SOEs is also better than that of average firms(if all firms are 
forced to be local SOEs).  These results suggest that the central government’s selection strategy 
is value enhancing for all SOEs. 
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Size has a negative effect on Tobin’s Q. As mentioned earlier, the impact of size is an empirical 
question. Large firms are subjected to more bureaucracy and inefficiency, which lowers the firm 
valuation.  
Log(K/S), has a negative and significant effect on Tobin’s Q and ROA. The results counter our 
prediction, perhaps because managers of central SOEs do not effectively make use of tangible 
assets, or because many of the assets are overinvested. The coefficient on [Log(K/S)]2 is -0.002 
for central SOEs in the ROA equation, which indicates nonlinearity between firm performance 
and the agency problem for central SOEs. The inflection point at which the Log(K/S)  that is 
associated with ROA begins to turn down is -4, which is -0.018 when we take the anti-log of K/S.8 
Y/S has positive effects on Tobin’s Q and ROA, which suggests that the free cash flow problem 
is not serious in Chinese SOEs, and an increase in operating income is associated with both 
profitability and firm valuation.  
HHI is negatively associated with ROA. An increase in HHI rank (from a moderate industry 
concentration to a high industry concentration) causes a decrease of approximately 1% in ROA 
for both central and local SOEs. The negative relation may be due to a lack of competition among 
SOEs, which leads to inefficient operation and a decrease in ROA. 
                                                 
8






, and we get Ln(K/S) = -4. Because Ln(K/S) is in log 
form, we take the anti-log to recover raw K/S, which equals 0.018.  
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The coefficients on S.D. are positive, at 1.672 and 2.082 for central SOEs and local SOEs, 
respectively, in Tobin’s Q equation, which suggests that risky firms are valued higher. This is 
consistent with the prediction of Jensen and Meckling (1976) that the value of equity is like an 
option, and shareholders prefer to take risky projects to increase the equity value.   
 
Next, we look at estimates for the labor intensity equation in panel B of Table 3. In case 3, Lcσ  
> 0 and Llσ  > 0, which implies that selection bias brings the labor intensity of central SOEs 
down and the labor intensity of local SOEs up.  
The coefficient on Size is negative, which suggests that large firms have lower labor intensity.  
Leverage has a positive impact on labor intensity. This finding contrasts the empirical results 
that have been found for developed countries, which support the disciplinary role of debt on firms 
(Ogawa 2003, Lang et al. 1996, Nickell and Nicolistsa 1999). Our finding suggests that SOEs 
pursue goals other than value maximizing. Even at a high level of borrowing costs, SOEs, unlike 
private firms, may choose not to reduce the labor force to improve efficiency due to concern for 
the employment level.  
Lastly, we find that Wage is negatively related to labor intensity. 
  38 
Table 3. Determinants of firm performance and labor intensity 
These tables report the estimates of equations (8)-(11) using data from 1998 to 2001. Tobin’s Q is 
calculated as the summary of the market value of tradable A and B shares, the book value of 
nontradable shares, long term liability, and short term liability, which is then divided by the book 
value of total assets. Profitability is measured as ROA: net income divided by total assets. 
Following Dewenter and Malatesta (2001), we use the measure for labor intensity, Labor, which 
is defined by the number of employees in enterprises divided by assets. Size is the natural log of 
the book value of total assets. Ln(K/S) is the log form of the ratio of tangible, long-term assets 
(PPE) to sales. [Ln(K/S)]2 is the square of Ln(K/S). Y/S is measured as operating income divided 
by sales. Leverage is defined as total debt divided by total assets. HHI (3 categories), the 
Herfindahl-Index, is calculated as the sum of the squares of the market shares of each individual 
firm in the market per year. Then, we divide this index into three categories, with 3 as the high 
concentration and 1 as the low concentration. S.D. is the standard deviation of monthly stock 
return per year. Wage is the average annual wage in urban collectively owned enterprises in a 
corresponding province, scaled by 10,000. IMR is the inverse Mills’ ratio. Panel A presents the 
Tobin’s Q and ROA equation estimates using Heckman two-stage estimation (1979).  
The absolute value of the z-statistic is in parentheses. 
 
Panel A. Determinants of firm performance 
 
 Tobin’s Q ROA 
 Central Local Central Local 
Variables estimates estimates estimates estimates 
Size -0.358** -0.403** -0.003 -0.002 
 (18.057) (27.814) (1.424) (0.527) 
Ln(K/S) -0.067** -0.036** -0.016** 0.001 
 (2.887) (2.655) (6.156) (0.454) 
[Ln(K/S)]2 -0.012 -0.007 -0.002** 0.000 
 (1.679) (1.300) (2.695) (0.311) 
Y/S 0.259** -0.018 0.180** 0.089** 
 (2.780) (0.894) (17.448) (18.829) 
HHI -0.009 0.016 -0.010** -0.014* 
 (0.280) (0.708) (2.776) (2.560) 
S.D. 1.672** 2.082** - - 
 (4.593) (9.681) - - 
Mills’: Lambda -0.137* 0.381** -0.024** 0.067** 
 (2.387) (6.489) (3.751) (4.800) 
Constant 8.839** 9.421** 0.103* 0.040 
 (19.607) (31.316) (2.090) (0.573) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 480 1887 480 1887 
Adjusted R2 0.50 0.43 0.473 0.208 
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Table 3 (continued) 
Panel B. Determinants of labor intensity 
Panel B presents the labor intensity equation estimates using Heckman two-stage estimation 
(1979). The sample period for Labor is from 1999 to 2001. 
 Central Local 
Variables estimates estimates 
Size -0.178** -0.713** 
 (2.826) (10.692) 
Leverage 0.653 0.907** 
 (1.901) (4.386) 
Market wage -0.351* -0.900** 
 (2.233) (7.210) 
HHI -0.242* -0.320** 
 (2.436) (3.259) 
Mills’: Lambda 0.649** 0.951** 
 (3.147) (3.352) 
Constant 5.184** 17.852** 
 (3.623) (13.210) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes 
   
Observations 370 1428 
Adjusted R2 0.182 0.153 
 
** and * indicate significance at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels, respectively. 
Wage and labor intensity are negatively associated, which is consistent with our expectation 
and the literature in that labor demand (labor intensity) is a function of the market wage, and 
when the market wage goes up, demand is reduced. 
HHI has a negative impact on labor intensity. A one unit increase in HHI rank (for example, 
from a moderate industry concentration to a high industry concentration) reduces labor intensity 
by 0.24 and 0.32 for central SOEs and local SOEs, respectively. The reduction accounts for 15% 
of the total employment intensity of these SOEs.9  
                                                 
9
 0.24/1.53 = 0.15, where 1.53 is the mean of the labor intensity for central SOEs.  
  0.32/2.087 = 0.15, where 2.087 is the mean of the labor intensity for local SOEs. 
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In summary, the central government is selective in choosing to retain control of SOEs. As a 
result, central SOEs have a higher market valuation and ROA and lower labor intensity than have 
average firms with the same characteristics and under the same business conditions.  
 
2.4.3 STRUCTURAL FORM OF THE CHOICE MODEL 
In this section, we study the factors that determine the government’s decision to retain control 
of central SOEs. Table 4 summarizes the results. The first two columns report estimations in 
which the differentials of P and L are estimated together and the last three columns report 
estimations in which each of the differentials is separately estimated in the third stage. The 
coefficients on the differentials of Labor are significant in all specifications, which indicates that 
the central government selects firms based on indicators of employment status. The positive and 
significant signs suggest that the central government is more likely to retain control of SOEs the 
labor intensity of which is relatively higher than that of local SOEs.  
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Table 4. Structural form of the choice model 
This table presents the probit estimates of factors that affect the government’s decision to hold 
shares of some SOEs and let go of others. There are 11 industry dummies. The baseline is the 
manufacturing sector. There are six Regional institutional factors: (i) government and market 
relationship index, (ii) private investment index, (iii) private employment index, (iv) local 
protectionism index, (v) credit market index, (vi) labor mobility index, and (vii) legal 
environment index. The last column shows the z-statistic.   
 estimates estimates estimates estimates estimates 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Labor differential 0.206** 0.222** 0.237**   
 (2.640) (3.291) (3.568)   
Tobin’s Q differential 0.276   0.842*  
 (0.809)   (2.397)  
ROA differential  2.051   2.589* 
  (1.624)   (2.031) 
Mining 1.207** 1.172** 1.200** 1.262** 1.237** 
 (3.988) (3.862) (3.970) (4.176) (4.080) 
Mass Communication, 
Arts, and Education 0.685 0.648 0.845* 0.696 0.607 
 (1.858) (1.763) (2.463) (1.892) (1.659) 
Utilities -0.074 -0.069 -0.072 -0.042 -0.020 
 (0.501) (0.471) (0.493) (0.289) (0.137) 
Real Estate -0.961** -0.990** -0.957** -0.952** -0.970** 
 (4.562) (4.644) (4.557) (4.515) (4.581) 
Construction 0.216 0.178 0.207 0.272 0.227 
 (1.060) (0.873) (1.018) (1.344) (1.116) 
Transportation 0.057 0.036 0.047 0.119 0.102 
 (0.375) (0.237) (0.313) (0.801) (0.688) 
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing 
and Hunting -0.358 -0.366 -0.357 -0.369 -0.381 
 (1.707) (1.744) (1.703) (1.760) (1.818) 
Wholesale and Retail trade -0.658** -0.664** -0.664** -0.678** -0.701** 
 (5.391) (5.431) (5.456) (5.568) (5.765) 
Social Services 0.261 0.265 0.248 0.279 0.257 
 (1.615) (1.652) (1.543) (1.730) (1.603) 
Information 0.376** 0.357** 0.377** 0.350** 0.315** 
 (3.093) (2.925) (3.104) (2.896) (2.603) 
Conglomerate -0.042 -0.048 -0.045 -0.079 -0.105 
 (0.319) (0.361) (0.340) (0.595) (0.792) 
Gov. and mkt. relationship index 0.026** 0.026** 0.025** 0.028** 0.028** 
 (3.837) (3.872) (3.757) (4.161) (4.148) 
Private investment index -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.611) (0.531) (0.550) (0.557) (0.504) 
Private employment index -0.027** -0.027** -0.028** -0.025** -0.025** 
 (4.006) (4.101) (4.158) (3.760) (3.778) 
Local protectionism index -0.010* -0.010* -0.009* -0.013** -0.013** 
 (2.304) (2.240) (2.210) (3.104) (3.096) 
Credit market index -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.001 
 (0.079) (0.105) (0.046) (0.158) (0.215) 
Labor mobility index 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 (0.629) (0.517) (0.657) (0.672) (0.622) 
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Legal environment index 0.025** 0.025** 0.024** 0.028** 0.028** 
 (4.864) (4.894) (4.828) (5.692) (5.771) 
Constant -0.975** -0.975** -0.838** -1.463** -1.327** 
 (4.316) (5.773) (5.747) (9.028) (10.032) 
Observations 2363 2363 2367 2363 2363 
Log Likelihood -1075.337 -1074.039 -1077.13 -1078.66 -1079.471 
Pseudo-R2 0.096 0.097 0.098 0.093 0.093 
 
** and * indicate significance at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels, respectively. 
 
 




Figure 1 shows the plot of probability of being a central SOE with respect to labor differentials. 
On the X axis, the labor differentials are initially negative at the left and become positive as they 
increase to the right. The probability of being a central SOE increases as the differentials become 
larger. It is not very surprising to find that the government has political objectives, which 
constitutes the main criticism of government ownership. It is also worth noting that the central 
government decision is also affected by valuation from the stock market and profitability from 
financial statements when we look at the results in columns (4) and (5), which suggest that stock 
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valuations and financial performance affect central government decision making, but not strongly 
when compared with employment.  
Next, we look at the central government’s industry preference. Our model treats the 
manufacturing industry as the benchmark industry. We find that the central government is more 
likely to retain control of firms in the mining and information industries. Firms in the real estate, 
wholesale trade, and retail trade industries are more likely to be locally controlled. The results 
interest us in that they cast a clear light on the policy of the central government for state 
ownership reform. Furthermore, the results show that central SOEs are of strategic importance for 
the government. In particular, the mining industry is important for economic and military supplies, 
and the information industry (such as the telecommunications sector) is necessary for public 
services. The central government’s preference for these industries reflects the growing consensus 
on the national importance of certain industries.   
Regional institutional factors also affect the central government’s decision making. Central 
SOEs are likely to be located in provinces in which there is little local government intervention in 
the local economy, a good regional legal environment but lower level of private employment, and 
stronger local government protectionism against interprovincial trading.    
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2.5 CONCLUSION 
In this study, we examine the central government’s decision to retain control of SOEs by taking 
into account its effects on firm market valuation, profitability, and labor intensity. This study 
presents three key findings. First, the central government makes its decision based on firm 
performance and labor intensity, but more attention is given to labor intensity. More specifically, 
the central government controls SOEs the labor intensity of which is higher than that of local 
SOEs. This selection rule shows that the central government pursues non-economic objectives in 
its state ownership management. The second finding points to the central government’s 
preference for certain industries. Firms in the real estate, wholesale trade, and retail trade 
industries are more likely to be held by local governments, whereas firms in the mining and 
information industries are more likely to be kept under the control of the central government. 
Finally, we find that local conditions affect central government decision making: central SOEs 
are likely to be located in provinces in which there is little local government intervention in the 
local economy, a good regional legal environment but lower level of private employment, and 
stronger local government protectionism against interprovincial trading.              
This study has certain limitations. The ownership of the majority of central SOEs was 
decentralized and handed to local governments from the 1980s to early 1990s. The data for this 
period is difficult to obtain. Hence, we are unable to assess the effect of decentralization by 
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comparing the firm performance and labor intensity around the time when ownership changed. 
Nevertheless, the methodology that was adopted in this study has certain advantages to overcome 
the problem when we turn our focus to examine the central government’s incentives for holding 
state shares by utilizing the current status of the ownership data.  
It is not surprising to find that the central government has non-economic objectives when it 
makes a decision. Many previous studies have argued that SOEs perform poorly because the 
government requires that SOEs undertake social functions. However, no direct evidence is 
provided for this argument. In this study, we use an improved research design to provide evidence 
to show that ex ante the central government has non-economic concerns in its state ownership 
management. This study underlines the importance of taking into account the objectives of the 
central government when assessing the performance of SOEs or privatized firms. If the impact of 
the objectives of the central government is not taken into account, biased conclusions may be 
drawn when estimating the performance of different SOEs. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE IMPACT OF THE COMMERCIAL BANK ACT ON THE  
LENDING BEHAVIOR OF A STATE BANK  
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Governments regulate the credit market with a variety of goals in mind. Generally, regulators 
believe that good regulation and supervision can improve bank performance and that the 
improved performance will in turn accelerate economic and financial development. Banking 
regulators in China share these general objectives and intend to regulate banks under a sound 
legal framework. 
From 1986 to the early 1990s, there was a weak legal system for banking regulation and 
supervision in China. 10  Most banks were controlled by local governments through 
administrative methods. The local governments, however, did not treat banks as commercial 
banks, but treated them as ATM machines from which they withdrew money that they directed to 
SOEs. However, many of the SOEs were unprofitable or inefficient. Because of the behavior of 
the local governments, a serious moral hazard problem was created—banks had few incentives to 
practice risk management. As a result, policy lending, or local-government-directed lending, 
accounted for 20% to 60% of the assets at four state-specialized banks (see Lou 1993). A vast 
                                                 
10
 Liu Mingkang, 2005. Construction of the Legal Framework for Banking Regulation and Supervision in Modern 
China. Paper presented at the 22nd Congress on the Law of the World, 2005. 
  47 
number of non-performing loans (NPLs thereafter) were accumulated: “…past due loans, 
doubtful loans, and bad debt constituted 12%, 8%, and 2%, respectively, of the combined value of 
the loan portfolios of the four largest state-owned banks at year-end 1995” (Lardy 1998, 119). 
The large proportion of NPLs seriously affected the profitability of banks. The return on assets of 
banks decreased from 1.4% in 1985 to 0.3% by 1994 (Lardy 1998). 
Having recognized the problems of state banks, the central government attempted to tackle the 
situation in the early 1990s. One of the most notable moves was the enactment of the Commercial 
Bank Act in 1995. Thereafter, the nature of state banks changed substantially. They were no 
longer policy banks or state-specialized banks but became state-owned commercial banks. The 
two types of banks differ in their responsibility for the bank’s profitability. State-specialized 
banks had been established to supplement the work of government in providing funds to SOEs. It 
did not matter whether loans were commercially desirable because the government would be 
responsible for the loss. In contrast, commercial banks set up criteria to screen borrowers. The 
Act clearly signaled that commercial banks would be responsible for their profits and losses after 
1996. To make the signal credible, the central government implemented a series of reforms 
around 1995 (see section 2 for a review). It was expected that the change in the nature of banks 
would motivate the banks to reduce the moral hazard problem and to employ credit risk 
management.  
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However, skeptics countered that despite the intentions of the central government, the change 
in the nature of banks might not necessarily be effective. Two important factors needed to be 
considered. One factor was the quality of borrowers. It is generally accepted that in the early 
1990s, the average borrower was not the ideal banking customer. Some borrowers falsified 
financial statements, delayed making interest payments, or defaulted on loan payments. As the 
ultimate risk of banks comes from borrowers, if the quality of borrowers did not improve and if 
banks could not distinguish good borrowers from the poor, the Commercial Bank Act would be 
ineffective. The second factor was the intervention of local governments in bank lending 
decisions. Many state banks were required to lend to SOEs to support the local economy. 
However, SOEs suffered from many problems (Qian 2000). If such local government-directed 
lending persisted after the Commercial Bank Act, the Act would be ineffective, impacting the 
bank’s profitability. 
In this study, we assess the impact of the Commercial Bank Act on the lending behavior of 
state banks. Employing a unique database from a state-owned bank in China, we investigate the 
aforementioned issue to determine whether the quality of the lending decisions of the bank 
improved after 1995 when the Commercial Bank Act was enacted. It is hypothesized that banks 
strengthen their credit risk control of borrowers after 1995.  
The data we use include 2,459 commercial loans from a branch of a government-owned bank 
with over 30% state shareholding. The government is also the largest shareholder in the bank. For 
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each loan, we collect information on the contract terms and borrower characteristics. We split the 
sample into two periods, 1990-1995 and 1995- 2004, and divide borrowers into two groups, SOEs 
and private firms. Using a simultaneous framework in which the lending rate, maturity, and 
collateral status are written into the loan contract at the same time, we compare the determinants 
of the interest rate spread in the two periods. We present three main findings. First, after 1995, the 
state bank undertook more rigid screening of its borrowers—the screening mechanism considered 
the size of the borrowing firm, ownership of the borrowers, collateral status, and credit rating of 
the firm. In contrast, previously, the loan maturity, collateral status, and the length of the 
relationship between the borrower and the bank were important factors of the lending decision. 
This suggests that the enforcement of the Commercial Bank Act has helped to strengthen risk 
control by commercial banks. Second, we find that the SOEs are charged an interest rate higher 
than that of private companies. Taken together, generalization of these two findings suggests that 
government banks do not offer “easy money” to SOEs. Third, we find negative interrelationships 
between maturity and collateralized loans, which indicates that if a loan is secured via collateral, 
the maturity is reduced. We propose an explanation for the counterintuitive result that the bank 
requires collateral from riskier borrowers, and hence grants short maturity loans to reduce lending 
risk. 
Our study addresses a neglected aspect of Chinese bank lending behavior, as there are only a 
few studies of the performance of state banks in China. This is an odd oversight given the 
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significance of the banking sector in China’s financial markets. Two papers are related to this 
study. Cull and Xu (2000, 2003) study banking reform before 1995. First, they find that bank 
employees assess the credit risks of SOEs better than do the bureaucrats, because banks impose 
stricter budget constraints on SOEs; however, those constraints are softened after 1990. Second, 
they find a positive relation between bank finance and firm profitability; however, the relation is 
weakened in the 1990s as banks increasingly assume responsibility for bailing out SOEs. In this 
study, we provide new evidence on recent developments in bank lending. To the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first empirical research that reports comprehensive evidence on the pricing 
strategy of a government-owned commercial bank in China. The results of this study provide 
useful statistics for policy makers and investors to evaluate the performance of government banks 
over the past 14 years. It shows the change in government bank-lending strategies and the 
positive effects that the enactment of the Act have had on Chinese commercial banks.  
The remainder of the study is organized as follows. Section 3.2 briefly outlines  banking 
reform in China. Section 3.3 presents the literature review. Section 3.4 discusses the methodology. 
Section 3.5 describes the sample and data. Section 3.6 presents the empirical results. Section 3.7 
discusses the robustness tests and section 3.8 concludes the study.   
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3.2 A SHORT HISTORICAL DESCRIPTION OF BANK REFORM IN CHINA 
The Chinese economic reform process officially began in December 1978 at the Third Plenum 
of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. Banking reform was 
necessarily part of the economic reform, and comprised three stages. 
The first stage ran from 1978 to 1986. In the initial stage of the reform, the government 
implemented a new policy that required banks to take over financing functions from the 
government, which had granted funds to SOEs without interest rate charges. This was an 
important step towards a market economy because the funding was now financed through 
market-based bank lending. It was expected that the banks would monitor the use of funds and 
screen good borrowers from bad ones. Gradually, banks expanded their business and dominated 
the deposit and lending market. However, the development of banking regulations did not match 
the growth of banks. The People’s Bank of China (People’s Bank hereafter) was still unable to 
efficiently manage monetary policies, bank supervision, and other financial activities. Therefore, 
the first stage of the reform was to reposition the People’s Bank to make it viable in the emerging 
market economy. For example, the People’s Bank handed over the deposit and lending business 
to newly established state-owned specialized banks.  
The second stage took place from 1986 to 1994. In 1986, Provisional Rules Governing Banks 
was issued. It listed the nature, responsibilities, and business scopes for the People’s Bank, 
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state-owned specialized banks, and other financial intermediaries. The Provisional Rules 
provided an official acknowledgment that the banking system had changed from being a one-tier 
system (the People’s Bank only) to a two-tier system (the People’s Bank  specialized banks and 
other financial intermediaries). Entry of new financial institutions was permitted, and most of 
them were set up as joint stock banks the shareholders of which were the Ministry of Finance, 
central government controlled conglomerates, or local governments. 
The third stage began in 1995 and continues today. China is pushing ahead with reforms in 
banking as it aims to transform former stated-owned specialized banks and newly established 
banks into commercial banks. To help commercial banks to grant commercially-oriented loans, 
China established three new policy banks from 1993-1994 to take over the policy lending loans 
from the state-owned specialized banks. In 1995, the entire framework of the regulatory legal 
system for banking was established by implementing two important Acts11 and a number of 
important administrative rules and regulations. The key aim of the Acts and regulations was to 
enhance the awareness of credit risk in the lending business among banks and to make 
commercial banks accountable for profitability. The Commercial Bank Act requires banks to 
operate prudential banking operations. Some of the articles of the Act are included in Appendix 
B.  
                                                 
11
 The two important Acts are the Act of the People’s Republic of China on Commercial Banks (1995) and the Act of 
the People’s Republic of China on the People’s Bank of China (1995). 
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To improve risk management within banks, in 1998 China adopted a five-tier international 
classification system that ties risk to loan quality on an ongoing basis. This risk-based approach 
divides loans into five categories—pass, special-mention, substandard, doubtful, and loss—with 
the last three categories recognized as nonperforming loans (NPLs hereafter). A loan can be 
downgraded from pass to special-attention before its maturity if any significant negative news is 
expected. After downgrading, a corresponding provision rate is applied to each of the categories: 
2% for special-attention, 20% for substandard, 50% for doubtful, and 100% for loss (the People’s 
Bank of China, 2002). The new system replaced the old credit control system, which had 
underestimated the credit risk because it could only recognize default risk after a loan had 
defaulted.  
Besides risk management in banks, an important factor that can improve a bank’s risk 
evaluation of borrowers is related to the Credit Register and Check System (CRSC hereafter), 
which was introduced in 1997 by the People’s Bank. This database collects and provides financial 
information and past loan records of borrowers to banks. To begin, every borrower applies for a 
loan card from the People’s Bank. Each loan card has a unique loan card number. Using this loan 
card number in the CRSC, banks have the right to check the past loan records and update the 
current loan performance of each borrower. Key information that is provided includes the interest 
rate, loan size, maturity, financial information, unpaid interest, and history of litigation. As the 
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CRSC applies to all enterprises in the country, the information that it collects is disclosed to all 
banks, but the CRSC cannot disclose the name of a bank that has given the loan.  
3.3 LITERATURE REVIEW 
This study is relevant to the literature that examines the characteristics of borrowers and the  
loan contracts of banks. Most research focuses on the determinants of lending rates under a single 
feature of the contract. For example, Degryse and Ongena (2005) examine how lending rates are 
affected by loan conditions including the geographical distance between firms, the lending bank, 
and all other banks in the vicinity. They find that the shorter the distance between the firm and 
lending bank, the lower the lending rate that is charged. La Porta et al. (2003) document that in 
many countries, banks lend to firms that are controlled by the owners of the banks. They study 
the benefits of related lending in Mexico and find that related loans are 4 percentage points lower 
than unrelated loans. Peterson and Rajan (1994) study the impact of relationship lending on the 
availability and cost of funds to the borrower. They find that close ties between a firm and its 
creditor are valuable and that this close relationship increases the availability of financing to the 
borrower. 
Apart from studies of the determinants of lending rates, a range of theories has been proposed 
to explain other important features in a lending contract, such as debt maturity, collateral status, 
and relationship banking. Diamond (1991) examines how borrowers choose a maturity structure 
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and how their choice depends on their credit rating. Diamond assumes that a firm is subject to 
liquidation risk, which is defined as the risk that a firm is unable to pay back its debt and thus will 
be liquidated by lenders. A firm’s optimal maturity structure is analyzed as a trade-off between a 
borrower’s preference for short maturity due to the expected improvement in its credit rating and 
the liquidation risk. He argues that good borrowers prefer a short-term debt contract because they 
can get better lending rates for refinancing when good news arrives. Bad borrowers prefer a 
long-term debt contract because the liquidation risk is lower compared to the liquidation risk 
under a short-term debt contract. However, borrowers with very poor rating can borrow only 
short-term debt because they are rationed out of the long-term debt market. Thus, Diamond (1991) 
postulates the following nonmonotonic relation between a firm’s credit rating and its debt 
maturity: all else being equal, good borrowers prefer short-term debt, medium-rated borrowers 
prefer long-term debt, and bad borrowers have no choice but to use short-term debt.  
Besides the maturity structure, collateral status is another important feature in debt contracts. 
Boot and Thakor (1994) consider the bank-borrower relationship using a model of multiperiod 
loan contracts in which the lending rate and collateral are determining factors. The infinite 
repeated games result in no moral hazard and the bank chooses the contract that dynamically 
optimizes the incentives of the borrower without loosing this borrower to competing banks. They 
argue that long-term contracting under a durable relationship enables the bank to effectively 
charge lending rates for borrowers through time by reducing the use of collateral. Therefore, 
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banks require collateral from new borrowers and do not require collateral from established 
borrowers. Their study suggests a negative relationship between the length of a bank-borrower 
relationship and collateral status.  
Relationship lending is also widely studied in the banking literature. The impact of the 
bank-borrower relationship is captured in relationship length. Conditional on its past experience 
with the borrower, the lender now expects loans to be less risky. This should reduce the lending 
rate of the loan over time. However, on the minus side, a credible long-term relationship may 
leave the borrower and bank locked in to one another, so the borrower may exploit the bank or the 
bank may exploit the borrower and charge higher interest rates to the borrower (Sharpe 1990, 
Rajan 1992). In Rajan (1992), investors (either banks or bondholders) delegate monitoring 
activities. After an entrepreneur’s exercise of his unobservable effort, an interim private and 
unverifiable signal reveals whether the firm will be successful or not. If the bank holds short-term 
debt, it can threaten to liquidate the firm regardless of the interim signal, which triggers 
renegotiation. If the bank’s bargaining power is high in the renegotiation, it can hold up the 
entrepreneur for a high share of surplus. This implies that the bank relationship is positively 
related to the lending rate. Long-term bank debt removes the hold-up problem by removing the 
bank’s ability to threaten to liquidate the borrower. When a bank’s bargaining power is low, the 
opposite is true. Therefore, relationship lending has both pros and cons. Which of these is 
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dominant depends on both the nature of the borrowers and the bank in this sample, which is an 
empirical question. 
The aforementioned studies focus on a single feature of a contract and how banks use the 
feature to minimize the agency costs that arise from information asymmetry; therefore, they do 
not fully address the relation between the lending rate and the interdependence of other contract 
terms such as collateral status and maturity. For example, the agency costs that arise from asset 
substitution and underinvestment in the presence of asymmetric information may be limited by 
shortening the maturity of debt contracts or requiring collateral (Myers 1977, Jensen and 
Meckling 1976). Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that once a debt is issued, the value of the 
equity is like an option due to the limited liability of the equity holders. Consequently, equity 
holders will have incentives to increase the risk of the firm to increase the equity value at the 
expense of debt holders. The asset substitution problem occurs when shareholders use riskier 
assets (by taking risky projects) to substitute for the firm’s existing assets. The reverse of the 
asset substitution problem is the underinvestment problem in which shareholders have low 
incentives to take positive net-present-value (NPV hereafter) projects. Myers (1977) argues that 
equity holders may not undertake certain positive NPV projects, especially when the firm value is 
low. Because it is hard for a firm to obtain refinancing from a bank when it is experiencing 
financial distress, the financing of the project has to come from shareholder wealth, yet 
shareholders bear the full costs of the project when the project fails while sharing the benefits 
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with debt holders when the project is successful. Consequently, underinvestment arises. Banks 
can reduce these moral hazard problems by shortening the maturity of the debt contract or 
requiring collateral. Thus, debt maturity and collateral status should be modeled as substitute 
mechanisms in a debt contract.   
To account for the problems that are mentioned above, some empirical studies have 
incorporated the interdependencies between contract terms by estimating a simultaneous equation 
model. Dennis et al. (2000) model the duration (maturity), collateral status, lending rate, and 
commitment fee on undrawn funds in a simultaneous decision framework. They find strong 
interrelationships between the duration and collateral status and between the lending rate and 
commitment fee. Thus, the results of their study suggest that the setting of debt contract terms as 
a whole plays an important role in alleviating contracting problems. 
Our study follows the implications of the studies of Diamond (1991), Boot and Thakor (1994), 
and Rajan (1992) and tests their predictions in the simultaneous framework that is proposed in 
Dennis et al. (2000).   
 
3.4 METHODOLOGY 
Dennis et al. (2000) consider a bank debt contract that is written with four features—the 
duration (maturity), collateral status, lending rate, and commitment fee on undrawn funds. To 
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reflect the joint consideration of the contract terms, they model the choice of maturity and 
collateral status first, and then model the lending rate and commitment fee, which are determined 
by the choice of maturity and collateral status. We follow their methodology, but consider only 
the first three contract terms and ignore commitment fee because the bank in our sample does not 
have a commitment fee in its loan pricing. The model takes the following form: 
(1) Maturity = 1111 eXCollateral +′+ βγ , 
(2) Collateral = 2222 eXMaturity +′+ βγ , and 
(3) Interest rate spread = 33343 eXMaturityCollateral +′++ βγγ , 
where Collateral is a discrete [1,0] variable, and interest rate spread is the difference between the 
loan rate and prime rate; iγ  are the coefficients of the interdependence effects between the 
contract terms; Xk (k = 1 to 3) are the vectors of the other explanatory variables with Kβ  
representing the effect of the contract terms on those three debt features; and eK are the residuals.  
Following the implication of Diamond (1991), we include firm size, credit rating, and the 
square of credit rating as explanatory variables in equation (1) to capture the nonmonotonic 
relation between credit rating and the maturity of a loan. In specification (2), we include firm size, 
credit rating, and relationship length as explanatory variables to test the implication of Boot and 
Thakor (1994) of the negative relation between loan collateral and relationship length.  
  60 
 A difficulty in estimating the simultaneous equations is that the dependent variables include a 
mix of discrete choice (collateral), continuous (maturity), and censored (interest rate) variables. 
We apply a two-stage estimation procedure for simultaneous equation models with limited 
dependent variables. We use the maximum likelihood method for the reduced-form equations in 
the first stage. Then, the structural parameters are estimated in the second stage using the least 
squares method. The results of the simultaneous equations are presented in section 6.3. 
 
3.5 DATA 
This study uses two unique and private databases that describes the terms of commercial loans 
that were granted by a branch of two nation-wide commercial banks. These are current available 
best databases that have complete data series. No missing values for any observation and any 
variable. It is all computer-stored, and has been corrected (if there is any mistake) by the internal 
examiners. Data stored in this database are for internal use, and should not have fake data. 
Furthermore, internal officials cannot manipulate exiting data for their private benefits because all 
the interest charges are calculated based on built-in programming. They are not allowed to revise 
the programming. We use Bank A’s database in the main tests, and Bank B’s database in 
robustness tests. Bank A is a government-controlled joint stock bank that had more than 2,000 
branches and sub-branches and more than 50,000 employees across the country by the end of 
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2004. The branch that we examine is located in the middle region of China. It has 25 
sub-branches under its control. We believe this sample fairly reflects the general picture of the 
loan business in China given that the reforms in banks and SOEs in the middle region are modest 
compared to those in the coastal region.  
For a robustness check, we employ a different database from another nation-wide 
government-controlled bank (bank B). The data that are used in the robustness check are from 
1999 to 2004. We are interested in comparing the terms that are offered by stated-owned 
enterprises to those that are offered by private borrowers. We split the sample into two periods, 
1990-1995 and 1995-2004, because we intend to examine the impact of the Commercial Bank 
Act on the lending behavior of a government-controlled commercial bank.  
One important fact in the loan business in China is that the interest rate is censored. The 
People’s Bank sets the basic interest rate (prime rate) and allows commercial banks to determine 
the lending rate within a band of the basic interest rate. The upper and lower limits of this band 
vary from time to time, and the band has a tendency to widen. The first time that this band is set 
within the sample period is 1990. However, at that time, censoring was not binding until 1995. 
On October 23, 1997, the People’s Bank set the bank rate at ±10% of the basic interest rate for 
short-term loans (one-year loans). The latest revision of the band in this sample period is on June 
10, 1999, at -10% and +50% of the basic interest rate for both short-term and long-term loans.  
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The credit profile that is represented here supplies the following information: (1) 
characteristics of the borrower (firm size and relationship length with the bank); (2) 
characteristics of the credit (interest rate, size of loan, maturity, collateral, and guarantees); and (3) 
ex ante performance of the loan (credit rating). 
The total number of loans in the sample is 2459 after excluding some unusual loans. There are 
654 borrowers. On average, borrowers had had more than 3 loan transactions with this bank.  
3.5.1 VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
R_diff: interest rate spread (in percentage form) between the interest rate that is charged on the 
loan and the prime rates of comparable maturity 
Loan size: natural logarithm of the amount of each loan 
Amount of loan: dollar value of each loan in RMB(￥) 
Maturity_year: length of repayment of the loan in years 
Relation_ length: natural logarithm of (one plus) length of relationship with the current 
borrower 
Collateral_loan = 1 if the loan is secured via collateral or guaranteed, 0 otherwise 
Small firm = 1 if the borrower is a small firm, 0 otherwise 
Medium firm = 1 if the borrower is a medium firm, 0 otherwise 
Large firm = 1 if the borrower is a large firm, 0 otherwise 
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State = 1 if the borrower is a SOE, 0 otherwise 
Private = 1 if the borrower is not a SOE, 0 otherwise 
Credit_rating: risk profile score for each firm that is made by a bank officer. It ranges from 1 
(best) to 6 (worst) 
Industry dummies: six industry affiliations—manufacturing, commerce, construction, 
foreign_trade, real_estate, and nonclassifiable establishments  
Acceptance bill = 1 if the borrower purchased the banker’s acceptance bill12 from the bank, 0 
otherwise 
3.5.2 SAMPLE DESCRIPTION 
Table 5 presents the basic data on the lending terms in the sample, broken down into three sets 
of characteristics: (1) ownership, (2) collateral, and (3) firm size.     
There are 2,459 loans13 granted with a mean of RMB6,970,078 (USD870,000) per loan on 
average, but loan size varies between RMB22,400 (USD2800) and RMB300,000,000 
(USD37,500,000). This wide range of variation is due to the long sample period and the fast 
                                                 
12
 When a bank issues a banker’s acceptance bill to the purchaser of the bill, the bank has an obligation to make 
payment to the bearer of the bill at the maturity day. After the payment by the bank to the borrower, the purchaser 
repays the funds to the bank within 6 months. Hence, the issuance of a banker’s acceptance bill is equivalent to the 
granting of a short-term loan to the purchaser. The procedure for checking and evaluating the risks for issuing a 
banker’s acceptance bill to a purchaser is the same as for granting a loan. 
13
 We exclude abnormal loans that have less than a 20-day maturity.  
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growth of Chinese enterprises. The exchange rates of the renminbi against the U.S. dollar from 
1990 to 2004 are reported in Appendix C. 
The average interest rate spread on a loan in our sample is 0.688. The spread varies 
considerably, from -4.98% to 5.76%. Despite the large variation, the spread of 95% of loans falls 
within the band stipulated by the People’s Bank.   
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Table 5. Descriptive data 
This data set comprises 2459 bank loans from 1990 to 2004. Panel A presents the basic data on 
lending terms in the whole sample. Panel B present the subsample data classified according to 
ownership. Panel C present the subsample data classified according to collateral status. Panel D 
presents the subsample data classified according to firm size.     
* Significant at the 5% level; ** significant at the 1% level. 
The maturity of a loan is another important factor in the debt contract. We include it in 
regression analysis as a proxy for the risk that is associated with the time until the loan is repaid. 
Most loans in the branch are short term because the average maturity is 0.8 year (9.6 months). 
Panel A Whole Sample 
Variables N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Amount of loan 2459 6,970,078 13,500,000 22,400 300,000,000 
Loan size 2459 14.720 1.500 10.017 19.519 
R_diff(%) 2459 0.688 1.118 -4.980 5.760 
Maturity 2459 0.795 0.506 0.077 7.003 
Credit_rating 2262 3.295 1.518 1.000 6.000 
Relation_length 2459 0.653 0.602 0.000 2.140 
      
Panel B SOEs Private firms  
Variables N Mean N Mean Difference 
Amount of loan 1660 7,093,843 799 6,712,945 388,898 
Loan size 1660 14.799 799 14.557 0.242** 
R_diff 1660 0.615 799 0.840 -0.225** 
Maturity 1660 0.812 799 0.761 0.051** 
Credit _rating 1536 3.136 726 3.632 -0.496** 
Relation_length 1660 0.715 799 0.526 0.188** 
    
Panel C Collateral_loan Noncollateral_loan  
Variables N Mean N Mean Difference 
Amount of loan 1461 8,214,867 998 5,147,797 3,067,071** 
Loan size 1461 14.877 998 14.491 0.386** 
R_diff 1461 0.786 998 0.545 0.241** 
Maturity 1461 0.805 998 0.781 0.024 
Credit _rating 1338 3.373 924 3.183 0.190* 
Relation_length 1461 0.655 998 0.652 0.003 
      
Panel D Small firm Medium firm Large firm 
Variables N Mean N Mean N Mean 
Amount of loan 754 3,305,662 1150 5,407,841 555 15,200,000 
Loan size 754 14.088 1150 14.621 555 15.783 
R_diff 754 1.139 1150 0.581 555 0.298 
Maturity 754 0.763 1150 0.797 555 0.838 
Credit_rating 703 3.954 1071 3.120 488 2.730 
Relation_length 754 0.504 1150 0.649 555 0.865 
  66 
The relationship characteristics control the information and experience effects. We include the 
natural logarithm of (one plus) the duration of the relationship in our analysis. A relationship 
starts from the first time that a firm obtained a loan from the bank. The average duration of the 
relationship is 0.65 (1.33 years) with the maximum of 2.14 (7 years).  
We also include the bank’s own ex ante credit rating on the loan to control the risk. It has a 
mean of 3.295 on a rating scale where 1 is the best rating and 6 is the worst rating. The score is 
estimated on the basis of a number of factors such as the financial health, industry outlook, past 
loan performance, and growth prospect of the firm. All these factors are associated with default 
risk and represent a firm’s aggregate risk factor.  
Panel B of Table 5 shows that SOEs borrow at a larger volume and have a lower interest rate 
spread and longer maturity term than do private firms. The favorable terms are supported by their 
better credit rating and longer relationship with the bank.  
Panel C of Table 5 shows that collateral loans are granted at a larger volume and higher interest 
spread. These loans have a poorer credit rating than have noncollateral loans. This result is 
consistent with the regulations that are set by the People’s Bank (see article 36) and the findings 
in Berger and Udell (1990) that collateral is most frequently associated with riskier borrowers and 
riskier loans.  
Panel D compares the loan characteristics for different borrowers. Small firms borrow at low 
volume, higher interest rates, and for shorter periods. This is probably because their credit rating 
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is poor and their relationship length with the bank is shorter. The situation is reversed for large 
borrowers. In general, as small firms are more likely to be a greater risk than are large borrowers, 
the loan terms are less favorable to small firms than to large firms. 
In sum, Table 5 gives a general picture of the loan characteristics. We find that favorable loan 
terms are granted when borrowers have a good credit rating and longer relationship with the bank. 
Firm size and collateral status are associated with the risk (credit rating) as well.  
Table 6 describes the debt contract terms, borrower characteristics, and the bank’s industry 
portfolio for SOEs and private firms for the two sample periods. 
Panel A in Table 6 shows that the volume of the loan expands to a size six times larger than it 
was in the first sample period, which suggests the strong financial needs of borrowers. The 
interest rate spread declines from 2.5-2.6% to 0.4-0.6% over the sample period, which may 
largely result from the increased competition among domestic banks. This decline is severer for 
SOEs than for private firms. The maturity of the loan is extended, especially for private firms. In 
general, the average maturity is less than one year, which suggests that most of the loans are short 
term and used as working capital. With regard to credit rating, we find that the average credit 
rating of SOEs (3.026) is better than that of private firms (3.489).  
Finally, the relationship length is longer for borrowers in the second sample period than in the 
first, and it is longer for SOEs than for private firms. 
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Panel B of Table 6 shows the collateral status and firm characteristics for the two periods and 
two types of enterprises, respectively. Since 1995, 70% of private borrowers have provided 
collateral or guarantees to the bank, while 50% of SOEs have done so. The borrower’s size is not 
equally distributed. Most SOEs are medium sized, while most private firms are small sized. 
Panel C in Table 6 gives us the industry distribution of granted loans. For the first sample 
period, we find that for SOEs the loans are mainly granted to the manufacturing, commercial, and 
foreign trade industries, and there is not one loan given to any private firms in foreign trade 
before 1995. This is largely due to the regulation of the foreign trade business. Moreover, it might 
have been too risky at that time for a private firm, located in the middle region of China, to do 
international trade in the early years of the economic reform. During the period from 1995-2004, 
we find that the industry distribution is more diversified for the two types of firms. The bank 
grants more loans in the commercial sector and fewer loans in the manufacturing sector for 
private borrowers. The loans in the private commercial sector account for 42.7% of the loans that 
are granted to private firms compared to 29.1% in the manufacturing sector. The bank also grants 
fewer loans in the manufacturing sector and more loans in the foreign trade sector to SOEs. 
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Table 6. Individual loan terms and industry distribution across the two sample periods 
This table describes the borrowing terms, borrower characteristics, and the bank’s industry 
portfolio for SOEs and private firms across the two sample periods.  
       
 1990-1995  1995-2004  
Variables SOEs Private firms  SOEs Private firms  
Panel A N Mean N Mean Difference N Mean N Mean Difference 
Amount of loan 99 1,650,960 69 1,117,246 533,713 1561 7,439,035 730 7,241,853 197,182 
Loan size 99 13.505 69 13.063 0.442* 1561 14.881 730 14.698 0.183** 
R_diff 99 2.577 69 2.640 -0.063 1561 0.491 730 0.670 -0.179** 
Maturity 99 0.760 69 0.499 0.261** 1561 0.815 730 0.785 0.030 
Credit_rating 86 - 69 - - 1450 3.026 657 3.489 -0.391** 
Relation_length 99 0.114 69 0.173 -0.059 1561 0.753 730 0.560 0.193** 
           
Panel B N Percentage N Percentage  N Percentage N Percentage  
Collateral_loan 99 63.6 69 52.2 11.4 1561 53.8 730 71.4 -17.5** 
Small firm 99 46.5 69 76.8 -30.3** 1561 21.8 730 43.1 -21.7** 
Medium firm 99 49.5 69 23.2 26.3** 1561 48.8 730 44 4.8* 
Large firm 99 4 69 0 -4* 1561 29.3 730 12.9 16.6** 
           
Panel C N Percentage N Percentage  N Percentage N Percentage  
Commerce 99 31.3 69 37.7 6.4 1561 29.1 730 42.7 -13.6** 
Construction 99 1 69 2 -1 1561 6.5 730 3.9 2.4** 
Foreign trade 99 15.1 69 0 15.1** 1561 25.8 730 2.6 23.1** 
Manufacturing 99 50.5 69 53.6 -3.1 1561 25.4 730 28.6 -3.2 
Nonclassifiable 
Establishment 99 2 69 1.44 0.56 1561 8.8 730 11.7 -2.9* 
Real Estate 99 0 69 4 -4 1561 1.47 730 13.3 -11.8** 
* Significant at the 5% level; ** significant at the 1% level. 
 
3.6 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
3.6.1 BANK LENDING RATES BEFORE AND AFTER 1995 
Table 7 presents the regression estimation of simultaneous equations (1), (2), and (3). We split 
the sample into 2 periods (1990-1995 and 1997-2004) for analysis because the data on credit 
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ratings begin in 1997. We first compare the results in columns 3 and 6, and then compare the 
results in columns 1, 2, 4, and 5.  
The regression results in columns 3 and 6 show the determinants of the interest rate spreads 
during the two periods, respectively. There are two distinct features that appear in column 6 but 
not in column 3. One is that the coefficient on State*credit_rating is significant at 0.046. The 
0.046 coefficient on the interaction term suggests that the interest rate spread increases by 4.6 
basis points for state loans if the credit rating changes 1 point. The credit ratings for private firms 
are not significant possibly due to the credit rationing effect, that is, bad private borrowers might 
have been rationed out of the credit market. 
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Table 7. Interest rate regressions 
This table estimates the factors that affect the maturity, collateral status, and interest rate 
simultaneously. Relation_length, Maturity, and Credit_rating are centered by subtraction from 
the mean to avoid the multicollinearity problem. This rescaling has no effect on the correlation 
properties of the rescaled variable. The absolute value of the t-statistic is in parentheses . 




 Maturity Collateral 
Loan 
R_diff  Maturity Collateral 
Loan 
R_diff 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Fitted maturity  -1.324 -1.424**   -1.823** -0.156 
  (-0.04) (-5.47)   (-20.68) (-1.22) 
Fitted collateral -0.858**  0.906**  -0.110**  0.115** 
 (-4.71)  (2.98)  (-2.46))  (4.16) 
State 0.754** 1.517 0.117  0.039 0.043 0.068** 
 (4.89) (0.03) (0.37)  (0.52) (0.29) (2.57) 
Medium firm -0.552** -1.07 -0.395  0.138 0.322 -0.189** 
 (-3.06) (-0.01) (-1.26)  (1.15) (1.14) (-4.69) 
Large firm 0.127 0.608** 0.159  0.243* 0.501* -0.369** 
 (0.33) (21.61) (0.17)  (2.22) (1.99) (-6.79) 
Relation_length  0.216 -1.256**   -0.03* 0.033 
  (0.01) (-2.33)   (-2.3) (1.35) 
Credit_rating     0.016 0.027 -0.009 
     (1.58) (1.51) (-0.63) 
Credit_rating2     -0.004** -0.03*  
     (-2.9) (-2.3)  
State*credit 
rating   
   
 0.046** 
       (2.84) 
Acceptance bill       -0.091 
       (-1.42) 
Commerce   0.402    0.066** 
   (1.21)    (2.23) 
Construction   1.112    0.059 
   (1.09)    (1.06) 
Foreign trade   0.502    -0.031 
   (0.89)    (-0.77) 
Nonclassifiable 
estab.   -2.632** 
  
 -0.002 
   (-2.61)    (-0.04) 
Real_estate   -1.986    0.038 
   (-1.89)    (0.7) 
Constant 0.930** 0.661 3.018**  0.670** 1.121** 0.481** 
 (6.67) (0.02) (6.23)  (18.69) (16.57) (7.05) 
Year Dummies   Yes    Yes 
Observations 168 168 168  1972 1972 1972 
AIC 1099  5615 
Log likelihood -516.54  -2767 
Schwarz Criterion 1202  5845 
 * Significant at the 5% level; ** significant at the 1% level. 
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Our results suggest that the bank has strengthened the credit risk control for SOEs. There are 
several possible factors that could drive the results. First, the bank is serious in lending and not 
obliged to bail out SOEs because it has gained more autonomous rights in the second sample 
period. Since 1995, government intervention, especially local government intervention, in 
banking activities has decreased. In 1998, the People’s Bank reduced the influence of local 
governments on bank lending activities by replacing its 30 provincial branches with 9 
cross-province regional branches. Second, the uncertainty that is associated with SOE reform has 
increased the credit risk of SOEs. In the early stage of SOE reform, the focus of reform was to 
introduce incentives for managers of SOEs, which resulted in an increase in the productivity of 
enterprises (Groves et al. 1995, Li 1997). However, the financial performance of SOEs continued 
to decline. In the late 1990s, the focus of SOE reform shifted to ownership and governance issues. 
However, the performance of SOEs is generally poor compared with the performance of private 
firms (Wei et al 2005). Based on these factors, it is understandable why a risk-oriented bank 
would charge slightly higher interest rates for SOEs that have low credit ratings.  
Another interesting feature in column 6 but not in column 3 is that SOEs pay slightly higher 
interest rates than do private borrowers by 6.8 basis points from 1997 to 2004. This is because the 
state firms might have less bargaining power or care less about the borrowing cost, while private 
firms care more about the cost of debt, which enables the bank to charge higher lending rates and 
take advantage of SOEs. To validate this argument, we split the sample into listed firms versus 
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nonlisted firms. Within the listed firm sample, the state borrowers have access to the stock market; 
we expect that the bank does not have the bargaining power to charge high interest rates. 
Consistent with this conjecture, we find that the coefficient on State is not significant (the result is 
not reported here). We also conduct the same analysis for the nonlisted firm sample, and the 
results (not reported here) are similar to the main results in Table 7. In column 3, the coefficient 
on State is not significant, which suggests that loan rates were not an important element in the 
debt contract before the Act.  
 We continue our comparison for other control factors in columns 3 and 6 in Table 7. In 
column 6, large firms pay 36.9 basis points lower than do small firms and medium firms pay 18.9 
basis points lower than do smaller firms. These findings are consistent with those in the literature, 
that is, large firms pay much lower interest rates than do medium or small firms. This size effect 
is not found in column 3 for the first sample period (1990-1995), which indicates the increasing 
awareness of risks among bank officials and their recognition of firm size as a risk factor. 
In columns 3 and 6, the coefficient on fitted collateral is significant at 0.906 and 0.115, 
respectively. The result is consistent with that of the study of Berger and Udell (1999), that is, 
riskier borrowers are more likely to pledge collateral. Therefore, they are charged higher lending 
rates.   
In the first sample period, Column 3 shows that borrowers with a longer relationship length are 
charged lower interest rates than are borrowers with a shorter relation length by 125.6 basis points. 
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This shows that a longer bank-borrower relationship leads to better lending rates for borrowers. 
However, we do not find evidence of this in the second sample period (in column 6), probably 
due to the strong interest rate censoring that started in 1997 which left the bank limited room to 
favor long-term customers in terms of the lending rate. 
In column 3, the coefficient on maturity is significantly negative at the 1% level: one increase 
in maturity from, for example, one year to two years, reduces the loan rate by 142.4 basis points. 
When we tabulate the loan rate versus maturity, we see a clear downward slopping yield curve, 
especially for loans with less than one year maturity (result not reported here). The negative effect 
of maturity on the loan rate is consistent with the result in the study of Degryse and Ongena 
(2005). They find that the negative relation holds for loans with a maturity shorter than five years, 
but when loans have a maturity longer than seven years, the increase in the duration increases the 
lending rate. Thus, the yield curve can be humped with the maturity. Ninety percent of the 168 
bank loans from 1990-1995 have maturities of less than one year. This explains the negative 
coefficient of maturity in regression.  
The coefficients of the contract feature interdependence terms, iγ , are also of considerable 
interest. So, we turn to the results that are shown in columns 1, 2, 4, and 5 in Table 7. There is a 
negative birelationship between the collateral status of a loan and the maturity of a loan in both 
periods, and this relationship is weaker in the period from 1990-1995. The longer the maturity of 
the loan is, the less likely it is that a borrower pledges collateral. Similarly, if a loan is secured via 
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collateral, the maturity is reduced. Although the results seem counterintuitive, they are consistent 
with our former explanation, that is, riskier borrowers are required to provide collateral, and 
banks have incentives to shorten maturity for risky borrowers.  
We also find strong evidence in Table 7 that is consistent with the prediction that is reviewed 
in section 3.3 and formulated in section 3.5. However, the evidence occurs in the period from 
1997-2004, which suggests that the loan pricing mechanism has become more rational. We find a 
nonmonotonic relation between maturity and credit rating in column 4, that is, borrowers with 
good credit ratings have short-term debt, those with intermediate ratings have long-term debt, and 
those with poor ratings can only have short-term debt, which is consistent with the result of 
Diamond (1991). We find a negative relationship between the length of a bank-borrower 
relationship and secured status in column 5, which is consistent with the implication of Boot and 
Thakor (1994).  
In general, the results from Table 7 suggest that the bank tightened control of the credit risk of 
borrowers after the passage of the Commercial Bank Act in 1995. 
3.6.2 SUBSAMPLE ANALYSIS OF CREDIT RATING 
In this section, we examine whether the credit rating that a bank assigns correctly reflects the 
financial status of a firm. Panel A of Table 8 summarizes the summary statistics of credit rating 
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for each year since 1997. It shows a clear trend that over time, the average rating decreases (the 
average quality of borrower improves) from 4.8 in 1997 to 2.2 in 2004.  
To explore whether credit rating reflects the financial health of borrowers, Long (1974) 
examines the determinants of agency rating in corporate bonds. He finds that more than half of 
the variation in ratings is explained by five variables from financial statements: total assets, times 
charges earned, debt to capital ratio, coefficient of the variation of times charges earned, and 
percentage of sales from communication services.  
We use Altman’s Z score as a proxy for the financial status of the borrower. Altman’s Z score 
is widely recognized and used to predict a company’s bankruptcy. It is a balance-sheet method of 
determining a company’s financial health. Thus, in this section we use a subsample of listed 
companies when we can obtain financial statements of the listed firms. There are 17 borrowers 
with 132 observations from 1997-2004. The Z score is calculated following Altman (2002).  
Z = 1.2WC_TA + 1.4RE_TA + 3.3EBIT_TA + 0.6MV_BV + 0.99S_TA 
WC_TA: working capital/total assets 
RE_TA: retained earnings/total assets 
EBIT_TA: earnings before interest and taxes/total assets 
MV_BV: market value of the equity/book value of total liabilities  
S_TA: sales/total assets 
Z: overall index 
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The higher Altman’s Z score is, the better the financial health of the borrower. The descriptive 
statistics and Spearman correlation coefficients for the key variables are reported in panels B and 
C of Table 8. In panel B, the credit rating has a mean of 1.65 within a range of 1 to 2. Due to the 
low variation of Credit_rating, we use the Spearman rank correlation coefficient to examine the 
relation between credit rating and Altman’s Z score, and with each element of Altman’s Z score. 
The correlation results are presented in panel C. We find that the higher the level of working 
capital, retained earning, and EBIT are, the better the credit rating of the borrower. The leverage 
and sales do not have significant effects on credit rating. 
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Table 8. Analysis of credit rating and Altman’s Z score 
Panel A 
Panel A presents the summary statistics of Credit_rating. It ranges from 1 (best) to 6 (worst). 
Year Obs. Credit rating Std. Dev. 
1997 184 4.848 0.511 
1998 110 4.218 1.207 
1999 190 3.342 1.389 
2000 215 3.158 1.473 
2001 312 2.792 1.374 
2002 349 2.768 1.348 
2003 392 2.577 1.355 





Panel B uses a subsample that comprises 132 bank loans to listed firms from 1997 to 2004. It 
provides descriptive statistics for credit rating, Altman’s Z score, and each element of Altman’s Z 
score.   
 N Mean Minimum Maximum Std. Dev. 
Credit_rating 123 1.642 1.000 2.000 0.481 
Z Score 132 2.260 -1.310 7.853 1.322 
WC_TA 132 0.094 -0.637 0.669 0.198 
RE_TA 132 0.068 -0.481 0.230 0.086 
EBIT_TA 132 0.045 -0.108 0.151 0.046 
BVE_TL 132 1.470 0.185 6.072 1.046 
MV OF EQUITY_TL 132 2.361 0.515 11.196 1.858 
SALES_ASSET 132 0.488 0.000 1.286 0.258 
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Table 8 (continued) 
Panel C 
Panel C presents the Spearman correlation coefficients. 
 
Credit 
rating R_DIFF ZSCORE WC_TA RE_TA EBIT_TA BVE_TL MVEQUITY SALES_ASSET 
Credit rating 1.000         
R_DIFF .244** 1.000        
ZSCORE -.142 -.080 1.000       
WC_TA -.328** -.325** .441** 1.000      
RE_TA -.337** -.060 .247** -.047 1.000     
EBIT_TA -.375** .066 .407** -.215* .678** 1.000    
BVE_TL .159 -.109 .580** .452** -.079 -.194* 1.000   
MVEQUITY .164 .014 .776** .394** .001 .002 .823** 1.000  
SALES_ASSET -.119 .047 .447** -.234** .292** .618** -.074 .066 1.000 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).   
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on credit rating, which may be because most loans have a short-term maturity. Because each loan 
is granted for 10 months on average, it is not surprising that the bank is more concerned with 
liquidity and profitability measures than with leverage and sales, which are more useful in 
long-term loan risk evaluation. 
To supplement our analysis, we use censored-normal regression that fits a model of the interest 
rate spread on Altman’s Z score and other independent variables. The censored-normal regression 
considers a case in which the dependent variable interest rate spreads are censored differently in 
each year. The results are reported in Table 9. Column 1 shows that Altman’s Z score has a 
significant negative impact on the interest rate. For a one unit increase in Altman’s Z score, the 
bank decreases the rate by 11.4 basis points for that borrower. Column 2 shows that after 
Altman’s Z score enters the equation, Credit_rating still shows a significant impact on the 
interest rate, which suggests that credit rating captures factors other than financial information. 
Taken together, the findings show that financial ratios, particularly liquidity and profitability 
measures, are related to credit rating, and that the overall financial status of borrowers is correctly 
priced by the bank.  
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Table 9. The impact of credit rating and Altman’s Z score on interest rates 
This table presents the regression results from a censored-normal regression that fits a model of 
the interest rate spread on Altman’s Z score and other independent variables. Relation_length, 
Maturity_year, and Credit_rating are centered by subtraction from the mean to avoid the 
multicollinearity problem. This rescaling has no effect on the correlation properties of the 
rescaled variable. The absolute value of the t-statistic is in parentheses. 
 (1) (2) 
 1997-2004 1997-2004 
Altman’s Z score -0.114** -0.109* 
 (3.29) (2.56) 
Credit_rating - 0.171* 
 - (1.98) 
State 0.152 -0.130 
 (1.11) (0.82) 
Medium firm -0.151 -0.412* 
 (1.08) (2.15) 
Collateral loan -0.021 0.000 
 (0.21) (0.00) 
Relation_length 0.009 0.069 
 (0.10) (0.72) 
Maturity_year -0.082 -0.101 
 (0.95) (0.97) 
Commerce 0.008 0.004 
 (0.09) (0.04) 
Nonclassifiable -0.059 0.006 
 (0.58) (0.05) 
Year dummies Yes Yes 
   
Constant 0.040 0.443 
 (0.22) (1.93) 
Observations 132 123 
Log likelihood -70.99 -62.64 
Log of the pseudo-R2 0.26 0.32 
* Significant at the 5% level; ** significant at the 1% level. 
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3.6.3 NONPERFORMING LOAN PERFORMANCE AFTER THE COMMERCIAL 
BANK ACT 
In the above analysis, we find that the bank tightened its risk control of borrowers after the 
enactment of the Commercial Bank Act in 1995. If the bank has correctly measured the risks, 
then we can expect a decrease in the number of nonperforming loans, which is a key measure of 
the quality of a bank’s assets. Table 10 reports the ratio of annual nonperforming loans (NPL ratio) 
to total credit from 1994-2005. The NPL ratio of the bank was reduced from 65% in 1995 to 3.8% 
in 2005, which means that 65% of the loans turned out to be bad loans in 1995 whereas only 
3.8% of the loans turned out to be bad loans in 2005. The trend of a reduced NPL ratio is also 
found in many commercial banks. By the end of 2006, the NPL ratio in four big state commercial 
banks was 9.22% and the NPL ratio in the remaining 12 commercial banks was 2.81%.14 
Our finding that the bank strengthened credit risk control supports the decrease in the NPL 
ratios that are found in many commercial banks.  
                                                 
14
 The data source is the Wall Street Journal, January 19, 2007. The four big state commercial banks are the Industrial 
and Commercial Bank of China, the Bank of China, China Construction Bank, and the Agricultural Bank of China. The 
remaining 12 commercial banks are the Bank of Communications Co., Ltd., Shenzhen Development Bank Co., Ltd., 
Guangdong Development Bank, China Everbright Bank Co., Ltd., Hua Xia Bank Co., Ltd., China Minsheng Banking 
Corporation Ltd., China Merchants Bank Co., Ltd., Shanghai Pudong Development Bank Co., Ltd., China International 
Trust and Investment Industrial Bank (CITIC), Industrial Bank Co., Ltd., Evergrowing Bank Co., Ltd., and China 
Zheshang Bank. 
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Table 10. Nonperforming loan performance before and after the Act 
This table presents the NPL ratios from 1994 to 2005 from Bank A. The NPL ratio is calculated as 
the annual nonperforming loans divided by the annual total amount of credit. 














After bank loans are classified as Non-performing loans, banks usually would sell NPLs to one 
of the four asset management corporations (AMC) which focus on the recovery of NPLs. Based 
on the various publications from China Banking Regulatory Commission, we report the recovery 
rates from the earliest available date in Table 11. On average, the recovery rate is stable at 24% 
for asset recovery and 20% for cash recovery from 2004 to 2006.  
As a comparison with other banks in China, Table 12 reports the NPLs of all Commercials 
banks in China. The NPLs by Five-category classification suggests that the NPLs decline from 
8.61% in 2005 to 6.63% in 2007. The NPLs by institutions breaks down the NPLs according to 
the type of financial institution. Foreign banks have low NPL ratios than all other banks, as low 
as 1% approximately. Bank A employed in this paper falls within the category of SOCBs. Its 
performance is lower than foreign banks, but better than the average of SOCBs.   
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Table 11. Recovery rate of NPLs 
This table presents the recovery rates from the four asset management corporations. Accumulated 
Disposal refers to the accumulated amount of cash and non-cash assets recovered as well as loss 
incurred by the end of the reporting period. Disposal Ratio is calculated as accumulated disposal 
divided by total NPAs purchased. Asset Recovery Ratio is calculated as total assets recovered 
divided by accumulated disposal. Cash Recovery Ratio is defined as cash recovered divided by 
accumulated disposal. 
 






Accumulated Disposal in RMB 100 mil 6750.6 8397.5 8663.4 
(Cash Recovered in RMB 100 mil) 1370.0 1766.0 1805.6 
Disposal Ratio 53.96% 66.74% 68.61% 
Asset Recovery Ratio 25.48% 24.58% 24.20% 
Cash Recovery Ratio 20.29% 21.03% 20.84% 
    
China Huarong Asset Management Corporation   
Accumulated Disposal in RMB 100 mil 2095.4 2433.8 2468.0 
(Cash Recovered in RMB 100 mil) 413.4 543.9 546.6 
Disposal Ratio 59.77% 69.17% 70.11% 
Asset Recovery Ratio 25.29% 26.92% 26.50% 
Cash Recovery Ratio 19.73% 22.35% 22.15% 
    
China Great Wall Asset Management Corporation   
Accumulated Disposal in RMB 100 mil 2099.1 2633.9 2707.8 
(Cash Recovered in RMB 100 mil) 215.7 273.5 278.3 
Disposal Ratio 61.91% 77.88% 80.11% 
Asset Recovery Ratio 14.43% 12.90% 12.70% 
Cash Recovery Ratio 10.27% 10.39% 10.28% 
    
China Orient Asset Management Corporation   
Accumulated Disposal in RMB 100 mil 1045.5 1317.6 1419.9 
(Cash Recovered in RMB 100 mil) 232.9 320.1 328.1 
Disposal Ratio 41.42% 52.08% 56.13% 
Asset Recovery Ratio 29.50% 28.73% 27.16% 
Cash Recovery Ratio 22.27% 24.30% 23.11% 
    
China Cinda Asset Management Corporation   
Accumulated Disposal in RMB 100 mil 1510.6 2012.1 2067.7 
(Cash Recovered in RMB 100 mil) 508.1 628.4 652.6 
Disposal Ratio 48.90% 63.82% 64.69% 
Asset Recovery Ratio 38.29% 34.30% 34.46% 
Cash Recovery Ratio 33.64% 31.23% 31.56% 
Data source: China Banking Regulatory Commission website 
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Table 12 NPLs of Commercial Banks as of end-March 2007 
RMB100 Million;  % 























13133.6 8.61 12549.2 7.09 12455.7 6.63 
Substandard  3336.4 2.19 2674.6 1.51 2613.2 1.39 
Doubtful   4990.4 3.27 5189.3 2.93 5176.6 2.75 
Loss  4806.8 3.15 4685.3 2.65 4665.9 2.48 
By Institutions       
Major commercial 
banks   12196.6 8.90 11703.0 7.51 11614.2 7.02 
SOCBs  10724.8 10.49 10534.9 9.22 10610.0 8.20 
JSCBs  1471.8 4.22 1168.1 2.81 1004.2 2.78 
City commercial 
banks   841.7 7.73 654.7 4.78 659.6 4.52 
Rural commercial 
banks   57.1 6.03 153.6 5.90 150.6 5.32 
Foreign banks  38.2 1.05 37.9 0.78 31.3 0.62 
Data source: China Banking Regulatory Commission website 
 
Note:  
1. The commercial banks include the state-owned commercial banks, joint-stock commercial 
banks, city commercial banks, rural commercial banks and foreign banks. The major commercial 
banks include the state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) and the joint stock commercial banks 
(JSCBs). The SOCBs include the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), the 
Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), the Bank of China (BOC), the China Construction Bank 
(CCB) and Bank of Communications (BOCOM). The JSCBs include CITIC Industrial Bank, 
Everbright Bank of China, Huaxia Bank, Guangdong Development Bank, Shenzhen 
Development Bank, China Merchants Bank, Shanghai Pudong Development Bank, Industrial 
Bank, China Minsheng Banking Co. , Evergrowing Bank, China Zheshang Bank and China Bohai 
Bank.  
 
2. As the number of the SOCBs and the JSCBs has increased in 2007 and 2006, figures of these 
institutions in 2007 and 2006 are incomparable with that of 2005. 
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3.7 ROBUSTNESS TESTING 
In this section, we present robustness testing to support the results that were obtained in 
sections 5 and 6. Due to space concerns, we do not report all of the results, but they can be 
provided upon request. The reported results appear in Appendix D. 
3.7.1 POSSIBILITY OF CREDIT RATIONING 
In section 3.6, we observed that the bank increases interest rates to cover its risk. It is also 
possible that the bank stops lending to risky borrowers by credit rationing. To verify this, we 
follow Atanasova and Wilson (2004) to examine if credit rationing existed. We test the 
hypothesis that SOEs face stronger rationing than do private borrowers. We use a sample of listed 
firms (for which we can obtain financial data) to implement this disequilibrium model. However, 
due to the low number of observations (96 observations), we do not find significant results.   
3.7.2 CONTROLLING FOR MATURITY 
In Table 9 of the summary statistics, most loans have a maturity of less than one year. In the 
robustness test, we have used a restricted sample of only one-year maturity. The results are not 
qualitatively different from the results that are obtained from the whole sample. 
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3.7.3 CROSS-SECTIONAL RESULTS 
The sample has 14 years of panel data. To take out the year effect, we have run year-by-year 
regressions. Again, the results are not qualitatively different from the main results.  
3.7.4 REPRESENTATIVENESS OF THE BANK DATA 
A criticism that we anticipate concerns the representativeness of the bank’s data. An empirical 
study based on one bank’s data may not speak for the changing lending behavior of banks in 
China. To address this issue, we employ a database from another government-owned joint 
commercial bank with more than 30% state ownership (bank B). Bank B is located in the same 
area as bank A. It has 9 sub-branches under its jurisdiction. The database we use in this section is 
from 1999 to 2004. We conduct regression analysis in the same way that we do in the previous 
sections and attach the results in Appendix D. Most variables are defined in the same way that we 
defined them for the main analysis, except for a few minor changes. Firm_grading is the risk 
profile score for each firm made by a bank officer. It ranges from 1 (best) to 8 (worst). 
Past_loan_status is equal to 1 if the past loan is NPL, and 0 otherwise. Please see Appendix D for 
more information. 
It is important to remember that we do not expect to find any similarity in the pricing strategy 
for these two banks because each bank has its own lending philosophy and its own resources and 
abilities to screen borrowers. The descriptive statistics in Table 14 of Appendix D suggest that the 
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two banks may have different target customers in terms of size. The average amount of loans after 
1995 is RMB7,400,000 in bank A, while it is RMB37,500,000 in bank B, that is, the loan size 
from bank B is five times larger than that from bank A. A comparison of panel D of Table 5 and 
panel D of Table 14 shows that a large borrower in bank A could be a small borrower in bank B. 
Differences in pricing can also be found in the interest rate spread, which is approximately 0.5% 
after 1995 in bank A, and -0.19% in bank B. However, given the differences, our aim in this 
section is to confirm whether the two banks, after 1995, seriously take credit risk into 
consideration when pricing and whether they pamper SOEs.  
In general, the results show that bank B carefully screens each borrower. In particular, in Table 
16 of Appendix D, we find that firm size, relation length, and past loan status are important 
factors in pricing, results that are similar to our results from the main sample. The coefficient on 
Firm_grading is not significant, possibly because Past_loan_status is a more important factor in 
loan pricing for bank B.  
 
3.8 CONCLUSION 
This study investigates the lending behavior of a government bank before and after the 
enactment of the Commercial Bank Act in 1995. We have three important findings. First, we find 
that the bank tightened risk control in granting loans after the passage of the Commercial Bank 
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Act in 1995. To be more specific, the credit rating of the firm, the size of the borrowing firm, the 
collateral status of a loan, and the ownership of borrowers are all important determining factors in 
the interest rate. Second, we find that the bank charges SOEs a rate of interest higher than that 
charged to private firms by 6.8 basis points. Third, we find negative interrelationships between 
loan maturity and the collateral status of a loan. We propose an explanation for the 
counterintuitive result that the bank can distinguish good borrowers from poor ones, and hence 
requires collateral from riskier borrowers and grants them short duration loans to reduce lending 
risk. 
The findings of this paper are drawn based on the results that are obtained from a provincial 
branch of a government-controlled commercial bank. Although the data are limited to one 
commercial bank, our findings should also be able to be generalized to other 
government-controlled commercial banks in China, because if the Commercial Bank Act is 
effective, we expect that the ratio of nonperforming loans (NPLs) to total credit should decrease 
for all commercial banks. The evidence shows that the NPL ratio of this bank was reduced, from 
65% in 1995 to 3.8% in 2005. This reduction is consistent with that of other nationwide banks, 
that is, the NPL ratio in four big state commercial banks was reduced to 9.22%, and the NPL ratio 
in the remaining 12 commercial banks was reduced to 2.81%. 
One weakness of this paper is the unavailability of the data of credit ratings and financial data 
before 1995. Due to the slow development of risk management in the banking industry in China, 
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banks did not have a system to perform credit assessment of borrowers in the early 1990s. The 
unavailability of this data, from another perspective, supports our hypothesis that the state banks 
only started to control credit risk after the enactment of the Commercial Bank Act in 1995.  
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first empirical research that reports comprehensive 
evidence of the recent progress of bank lending performance by evaluating the impact of the 
Commercial Bank Act. This investigation is timely, as there is ongoing banking reform in China, 
and it is important because it also provides some insights into a government banking system in 
transition. The findings of this paper also contribute toward the understanding of the importance 
of institutional development (i.e., an improved economic and legal environment) in financial 
markets.  




This thesis has demonstrated the interactions among government and economic institutions 
such as SOEs and state banks. Along a variety of dimensions, the political and market objectives 
of the Chinese government coexist in its reforms of SOEs and state banks. In the central 
government’s dealings with its SOEs, the labor factor is an important element for the government 
to consider in its state asset management framework. In the central government’s dealings with 
local governments, regional institutional factors affect the central government’s control over 
SOEs. In the central government’s dealings with state banks, it lowered its intervention in state 
banks after the enactment of the Commercial Bank Act in 1995, which pushes banks to reform 
under the discipline of the market. 
4.2. LIMITATIONS 
This study has certain limitations. The ownership of the majority of central SOEs was 
decentralized and handed to local governments from the 1980s to early 1990s. The data for this 
period is difficult to obtain. Hence, we are unable to assess the effect of decentralization by 
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comparing the firm performance and labor intensity around the time when ownership changed. 
Nevertheless, the methodology that was adopted in Chapter 2 has certain advantages to overcome 
the problem when we turn our focus to examine the central government’s incentives for holding 
state shares by utilizing the current status of the ownership data.  
4.3. IMPLICATIONS  
The main policy implications of the results that are presented in this thesis are as follows. First, 
the results shed light on the ongoing debate on the negative relation between firm performance 
and government ownership: the government’s political objectives could cause the poor 
performance of SOEs. Secondly, the impact of local factors on the central government choice 
contributes toward the understanding of the importance of institutional development. Thirdly, the 
results provide strong evidence of the effectiveness of the reforms of state banks. The results 
highlight the significance of the legal framework constitution in China and the achievements that 
have been made after the transition of banks from state-specialized banks to state commercial 
banks. Finally, the recent credit risk management failures in the US sub-prime market suggest 
strongly that a focus on bank lending performance is not solely in the purview of developing 
nations, but remains a vital issue worldwide.  
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APPENDICES  
APPENDIX A. THE DATA COLLECTION ON REGIONAL INSTITUTIONAL 
FACTORS 
I hand collected data from a series of books (Marketization Index for China’s Provinces) 
published by the National Economic Research Institute (NERI), China Reform Foundation. The 
data are from 1997 to 2001. The NERI uses the methodology of Economic Freedom of the World 
to rank Chinese provinces according to their level of market development. The Marketization 
Index provides valuable information on institutions and other variables of central importance to 
economic freedom but its primary purpose is to measure the development of competitive markets 
in China’s provinces. In other words, the index measures how far provinces have moved along the 
path to a market economy. The index has five areas: (i) government and market relationship index, 
(ii) private investment index, (iii) private employment index, (iv) local protectionism index, (v) 
credit market index, (vi) labor mobility index, and (vii) legal environment index.  
The NERI indices are widely used by economists and other social scientists who study 
institutions in China (see Fan et al. 2004 and Li et al. 2004). For more information on Economic 
Freedom of the World, please visit http://www.freetheworld.com/index.html. 
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APPENDIX B. THE ACT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON 
COMMERCIAL BANKS (EXTRACT) 
Article 4 Commercial banks should work under the principles of efficiency, safety, and fluidity 
with full autonomy and full responsibility for their own risks, profits and losses, and self-restraint. 
Commercial banks do business in accordance with laws free from any interference by units and 
individuals. 
Article 34  A commercial bank should issue loans in accordance with the need of the national 
economy and social development and under the guidance of the State industrial policies. 
Article 36 A borrower should provide guarantees for commercial bank loans. A commercial 
bank should strictly check the repayment ability of the guarantors, the ownership and value of the 
mortgage and working assets, and the possibility of claims to them. 
A borrower which has been proved having sure creditability for repayment through checks and 
assessments by the commercial bank may not provide guarantees for the commercial bank. 
Article 38 A commercial bank should decide the interest rates of loans in accordance with the 
upper and lower limits of loan interest set by the People’s Bank of China. 
Article 39 A commercial bank should abide by the following stipulations of the ratio between 
assets and liabilities: 
(1) the capital sufficiency rate must not be less than 8%; 
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(2) the ratio between the balance of loans and the balance of deposits must not exceed 75%; 
(3) the ratio between the balance of current assets and the balance of current liabilities must not 
be lower than 25%; 
(4) the ratio between the balance of the loan of one borrower and the balance of the capital of 
the commercial bank must not exceed 10%; and 
(5) other stipulations of the People’s Bank of China governing such ratios. 
Article 40 Commercial banks are not allowed to issue credit loans to people who have 
connections with the bank and the conditions for issuing guaranteed loans to people who have 
connections with the bank must not be more favorable than those for such loans to other 
borrowers. 
The people who have connections with the bank as referred to in the preceding clause are: 
(1) the directors, supervisors, management personnel, and credit loan business dealers of the 
commercial bank and their close relatives; and  
(2) companies, enterprises, and other economic organizations which have the people mentioned 
in the preceding clause as investors or senior management personnel. 
Article 41 No unit or individual is allowed to force the commercial banks to issue loans or 
provide guarantees. In other words, commercial banks have the right to refuse any unit or body to 
force it to do so. 
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The solely state-owned commercial banks should issue loans to special projects which have 
been approved by the State Council. The State Council will adopt corresponding measures to 
make up for the losses of the banks because of issuing the loans. What measures to adopt is up to 
the decision of the State Council. 
Article 47 Commercial banks must not raise or lower interest rates as against the stipulations 
or absorb deposits and issue loans through unjustified means. 
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APPENDIX C. THE EXCHANGE RATE OF THE RENMINBI AGAINST THE U.S. 
DOLLAR 
Table 13. Exchange rate of the renminbi against the U.S. dollar 
The exchange rates are reported by the Ministry of Commerce of the PRC. They are from 1990 to 
2004. 
 USD to RMB 
1990  4.7838 
1991  5.3227 
1992  5.5149 
1993  5.7619 
1994  8.6187 
1995  8.3507 
1996  8.3142 
1997  8.2898 
1998  8.2791 
1999  8.2796 
2000  8.2784 
2001  8.2770 
2002  8.2770 
2003  8.2770 
2004  8.2765 
Data source: Ministry of Commerce website 
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Appendix D. The Data Analysis for Bank B 
Table 14. Descriptive data for bank B 
This data set comprises 652 bank loans from 1999 to 2004 from bank B. Panel A presents the 
basic data on lending terms for the whole sample. Panel B presents the subsample data classified 
according to ownership. Panel C presents the subsample data classified according to collateral 
status. Panel D presents the subsample data classified according to firm size.     
* Significant at the 5% level; ** significant at the 1% level.  
Panel A Whole Sample 
Variables N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Amount of loan 652 37,500,000 46,200,000 39,000 500,000,000 
Loan size 652 16.659 1.557 10.571 20.030 
R_diff(%) 652 -0.192 0.348 -1.071 2.520 
Maturity 652 0.786 0.971 0.008 15.011 
Firm_grading 652 4.580 2.520 1.000 8.000 
Relation_length 652 0.533 0.529 0.000 2.040 
    
Panel B SOEs Private firms  
Variables N Mean N Mean Difference 
Amount of loan 216 43,500,000 436 34,500,000 9,058,192* 
Loan size 216 16.961 436 16.509 0.452** 
R_diff 216 -0.204 436 -0.186 -0.0182 
Maturity 216 1.069 436 0.645 0.424** 
Firm_grading 216 4.116 436 4.810 -0.694** 
Relation_length 216 0.579 436 0.511 0.067 
    
Panel C Collateral_loan Noncollateral_loan  
Variables N Mean N Mean Difference 
Amount of loan 578 37,400,000 74 38,200,000 -800,000 
Loan size 578 16.605 74 17.083 -0.478** 
R_diff 578 -0.187 74 -0.226 0.039 
Maturity 578 0.699 74 1.462 -0.763** 
Firm_grading 578 4.740 74 3.324 1.416** 
Relation_length 578 0.518 74 0.655 -0.136* 
    
Panel D Small firm Medium firm Large firm 
Variables N Mean N Mean N Mean 
Amount of loan 225 27,500,000 259 33,300,000 168 57,300,000 
Loan size 225 16.105 259 16.636 168 17.435 
R_diff 225 -0.238 259 -0.141 168 -0.208 
Maturity 225 0.639 259 0.823 168 0.924 
Firm_grading 225 6.178 259 4.363 168 2.774 
Relation_length 225 0.334 259 0.529 168 0.806 
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Table 15. Individual loan terms and industry distribution  
across the two sample periods for bank B 
This table describes the borrowing terms, borrower characteristics, and the bank’s industry 
portfolio for SOEs and private firms across the two sample periods using data from bank B. 
 1999-2004  
Variables SOEs Private firms  
Panel A N Percentage N Percentage  
Collateral_loan  216 0.713 436 0.972  
Small firm 216 0.148 436 0.443  
Medium firm 216 0.435 436 0.378  
Large firm 216 0.417 436 0.179  
      
Panel B N Percentage N Percentage  
Commerce 216 0.171 436 0.188  
Construction 216 0.060 436 0.018  
Public Utilities 216 0.236 436 0.073  
Manufacturing 216 0.259 436 0.323  
Nonclassifiable 
Establishment 216 0.065 
436 0.025  
Real Estate 216 0.065 436 0.078  
Conglomerate 216 0.144 436 0.294  
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Table 16. Interest rate regression for bank B 
This table estimates the factors that affect the maturity, collateral status, and interest rate 
simultaneously. Relation_length, Maturity_year, and Firm_grading are centered by subtraction 
from the mean to avoid the multicollinearity problem. This rescaling has no effect on the 
correlation properties of the rescaled variable.  
 Panel A 
 1999-2004 
 Maturity Collateral Loan R_diff 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Fitted maturity  -1.041 0.018 
  (-0.06) (1.33) 
Fitted collateral -1.136**  0.042 
 (-8.25)  (0.94) 
State -0.106 -0.576 -0.018 
 (-1.17) (-0.01) (-0.58) 
Medium firm 0.077 -0.396 0.142** 
 (0.81) (-0.03) (4.36)) 
Large firm 0.194 -0.272 0.100** 
 (1.65) (-0.01) (2.39) 
Relation_length  -0.007 -0.083** 
  (-0.00) (2.73) 
Firm_grading 0.004  -0.002 
 (0.24)  (-0.35) 
Firm_grading2 0.012   
 (0.88)   
Past_loan_status  0.083 0.328** 
  (1.63) (3.31) 
Conglomerate   0.065 
   (1.86) 
Public Utilities   0.006 
   (0.13) 
Construction   0.016 
   (0.21) 
Commerce   0.068 
   (1.74) 
Nonclassifiable   -0.04 
   (-0.58) 
Real Estate   -0.005 
   (-0.09) 
Constant 0.879** 1.199 -0.382** 
 (4.86) (0.02) (-6.22) 
Year Dummies   Yes 
Observations  652  
AIC 2239 
Log likelihood -1080 
Schwarz Criterion 2413 
* Significant at the 5% level; ** significant at the 1% level. 
 
